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Abstract
We provide a general framework for investigating partial identification of structural dynamic discrete
choice models and their counterfactuals, along with uniformly valid inference procedures. In doing
so, we derive sharp bounds for the model parameters, counterfactual behavior, and low-dimensional
outcomes of interest, such as the average welfare effects of hypothetical policy interventions. We char-
acterize the properties of the sets analytically and show that when the target outcome of interest
is a scalar, its identified set is an interval whose endpoints can be calculated by solving well-behaved
constrained optimization problems via standard algorithms. We obtain a uniformly valid inference pro-
cedure by an appropriate application of subsampling. To illustrate the performance and computational
feasibility of the method, we consider both a Monte Carlo study of firm entry/exit, and an empirical
model of export decisions applied to plant-level data from Colombian manufacturing industries. In
these applications, we demonstrate how the identified sets shrink as we incorporate alternative model
restrictions, providing intuition regarding the source and strength of identification.
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1 Introduction
Structural models have been used to answer a wide range of counterfactual questions in various fields
of economics, including industrial organization, labor, public finance, and trade. For problems involving
dynamic tradeoffs, the class of structural dynamic discrete choice (DDC) models has arguably been the
most commonly used in applied work; see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010), Keane, Todd, and Wolpin
(2011), and Low and Meghir (2017) for surveys of the literature. In such models, forward-looking agents
choose among discrete actions in order to maximize their expected discounted stream of payoffs given
a finite state space. In the canonical setting proposed by Rust (1987), the flow payoffs are allowed to
depend freely on the current action and state, and are additively separable to an unobservable i.i.d. shock
whose distribution is (typically) assumed known by the researcher. This class of models can be estimated
using data on individual choices and state variables (Rust, 1987; Hotz and Miller, 1993; Aguirregabiria
and Mira, 2002).
Despite being widely used by practitioners, Rust (1994) and Magnac and Thesmar (2002) have shown
that, in this class of models, a continuum of payoff functions can rationalize observed choice behavior.
That is a fundamental identification problem as different flow payoffs that are equally compatible with
the data can generate different behavioral responses in a counterfactual environment. While applied
researchers have typically addressed this problem by imposing restrictions that select among observation-
ally equivalent models, economic theory does not always offer guidance as to the correct assumptions
necessary to identify the true model. Given that such difficulties can threaten the credibility of structural
estimation, a recent literature has started to investigate this problem, and has shown that only a narrow
class of counterfactual experiments results in counterfactual behavior that is point identified (i.e., invari-
ant to identifying restrictions imposed on the model); see Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014), Norets and
Tang (2014), and Kalouptsidi, Scott, and Souza-Rodrigues (2019). Still, these important recent results
leave open a critical question: How much can be learned about counterfactual outcomes of interest under
minimal economic assumptions for a large (and empirically relevant) class of counterfactual experiments?
The main contribution of our paper is the development of a new framework to address this question.
The framework is tractable and involves minimal economic assumptions that may not suffice to point-
identify the model parameters, giving rise to partial identification analysis. We show how to characterize
and compute sharp bounds – that is, bounds that exhaust all implications of the model and data –
for counterfactual outcomes of interest, along with a uniformly valid inference procedure. We focus on
bounds for low-dimensional counterfactual objects that are relevant to researchers’ main conclusions and
are amenable to economic interpretation, such as the change in average welfare. These objects depend on
agents’ counterfactual behavior; i.e., the conditional choice probability (CCP) function under the coun-
terfactual environment. Our general procedure is valid for broad classes of counterfactual experiments,
model restrictions, and outcomes of interest, as we explain below.
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To fix ideas, consider the firm entry/exit problem – our running example. In this application, a firm
facing uncertainty about demand shocks and input prices decides in every period whether to enter (exit) a
market subject to entry costs (scrap values), with the goal of maximizing its expected discounted stream
of payoffs consisting of variable profits minus fixed costs. Typically, to estimate this model, researchers
assume the payoff of staying out of the market (the ‘outside option’) is zero, and also impose that scrap
values and/or fixed costs do not depend on state variables and are equal to zero. These assumptions
are often referred to as “normalization” assumptions, and they suffice to select among observationally
equivalent parameter values. Assuming scrap values or fixed costs are invariant over states however may
be a strong restriction for some industries; perhaps more importantly, setting them to have the exact same
value as the payoff of the outside option is difficult to justify: economic theory does not provide guidance
as to how to set these values, and cost or scrap value data are extremely rare. Further, these assumptions
are not always innocuous for important counterfactual questions, as shown in previous research (Aguirre-
gabiria and Suzuki, 2014; Norets and Tang, 2014; Kalouptsidi, Scott, and Souza-Rodrigues, 2019). Given
such limitations, we avoid these assumptions and focus directly on the identified set of counterfactual
objects (e.g., the welfare impact of a hypothetical entry subsidy) under much milder restrictions (such as
that entry costs/scrap values are positive, or that entry is eventually profitable). In the application, we
show how the identified sets shrink as we add alternative model restrictions, providing intuition regarding
the source and strength of identification.
We start the analysis of dynamic discrete choice models more generally by showing that the sharp
identified set for the payoff vector is a convex polyhedron whose dimension depends on the size of the state
space and the number of model restrictions that the researcher is willing to impose. Then, we show that
for a broad class of counterfactuals involving almost any change in the primitives, the sharp identified
set for the counterfactual CCP is a connected manifold with a dimension that can be determined from
the data.1 The set is therefore either empty (which occurs when the model is rejected by the data), or
a singleton (implying point-identification), or a continuum. The dimension of the set can be calculated
by checking the rank of a specific matrix, which depends on the data, the model restrictions, and the
counterfactual transformation, all of which are known by the econometrician. This dimension is typically
much smaller than the dimension of the conditional probability simplex, which implies that the identified
set is informative. Specific combinations of model restrictions and counterfactual experiments can reduce
the dimension of the identified set further, leading to point identification in some cases. To the best of
our knowledge, while partial identification and estimation of model parameters in DDC models have been
considered previously (see, e.g., Bajari, Benkard, and Levin, 2007; Norets and Tang, 2014; Berry and
Compiani, 2019), these are the first analytical results characterizing the identified set of counterfactual
behavior.
Given the identified sets for the high-dimensional payoff vector and counterfactual CCPs, we then turn
1We consider any change in the primitives except for nonlinear transformations in payoffs (uncommon in practice).
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to the low-dimensional outcomes of interest. Here, we show that the sharp identified set is also connected
and, under additional mild conditions, compact. This is convenient as in practice it is sufficient to trace
the boundary of the set. In addition, when the outcome of interest is a scalar, the identified set becomes
a compact interval, in which case it suffices to calculate the lower and upper endpoints. The endpoints
can be computed by solving well-behaved constrained minimization and maximization problems. The
optimizations can be implemented using standard software (e.g., Knitro), and remain feasible even in high-
dimensional cases involving large state spaces or a large number of model parameters. In our experience,
standard solvers perform best when the researcher provides the gradient of the objective function; for
cases in which computing the gradient is costly, we develop and propose an alternative (stochastic) search
procedure (discussed in detail in the Online Appendix). Overall, an attractive feature of this approach is
that the researcher can flexibly adjust (i) the set of model restrictions, (ii) the counterfactual experiment,
and (iii) the target outcome of interest, all without having to derive additional analytical identification
results for each alternative specification.
Our approach leads naturally to an inference procedure for empirical work. We develop an asymptoti-
cally uniformly valid inference approach based on subsampling, and construct confidence sets for the true
value of the low-dimensional outcome – rather than for the identified set – based on test inversion. We
elaborate on our inferential procedure later in the paper, but note here that many existing approaches
developed for moment inequalities and other set identified models are not easily amendable to our set-
valued counterfactual analysis; see Remark 4 in Section 5 for details. Taken together, these are the first
positive results on set-identification and uniformly valid inference procedures for counterfactual outcomes
of interest in structural dynamic models. These are the core contributions of our paper.
Finally, we provide evidence that our inference procedure performs well in finite samples based on a
Monte Carlo study of firm entry/exit. We then illustrate the policy usefulness of our approach by revisiting
the seminal contribution by Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) on exporting decisions and subsidies. Based
on their plant-level panel data from Colombian manufacturing industries, we explore the identifying power
of different model restrictions, discuss the assumptions under which alternative counterfactual subsidies
promote large impacts on export revenues per unit cost of subsidy, and generate the same rank of policies
as in Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) under weaker conditions.
Related Literature. A large body of work studies the identification and estimation of dynamic discrete
choice models. Rust (1994) showed that DDC models are not identified nonparametrically, and Magnac
and Thesmar (2002) characterized the degree of underidentification. Important advances that followed
include (but are not limited to) Heckman and Navarro (2007), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008),
Blevins (2014), Bajari, Chu, Nekipelov, and Park (2016), and Abbring and Daljord (2019). In terms of
estimation, Rust (1987) introduced the nested fixed point maximum likelihood estimator in his seminal
contribution, and Hotz and Miller (1993) pioneered a computationally convenient two-step estimator
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that was then further analyzed by a host of important studies (Hotz, Miller, Sanders, and Smith, 1994;
Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2002, 2007; Bajari, Benkard, and Levin, 2007; Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry,
2007; Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, 2008).2 We build on these literatures on point-identification
and estimation, and extend them to partial identification of model parameters and, more importantly,
counterfactuals.
Several important papers have considered partial identification and estimation of structural parame-
ters, namely Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), Norets and Tang (2014), Dickstein and Morales (2018),
Morales, Sheu, and Zahler (2019), and Berry and Compiani (2019).3 With the exception of Norets and
Tang (2014) (discussed further below), these papers consider classes of models that differ from, and do not
necessarily nest, ours. A common issue in this literature concerns the fact that existing inference methods
for partially identified models are computationally costly – if not infeasible – when the parameter space
is not small (they require repeated inversion of hypothesis testing over the parameter space); thus, prior
empirical work has only estimated the most parsimonious specifications. Substantial computational costs
may also limit the set of counterfactuals implemented, given that simulations for each parameter value
in the identified set are required. In contrast, our approach focuses inference directly on low-dimensional
final objects of interest – which are typically nonlinear functions of CCPs and model primitives – thus
allowing for a large number of model parameters and richer empirical applications. As such, our approach
complements, and can be combined with, the previous contributions.
A small but growing literature investigates the identification of counterfactuals in DDC models. The
main contributions in this area are by Aguirregabiria (2010), Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014), Norets and
Tang (2014), Arcidiacono and Miller (2018), and Kalouptsidi, Scott, and Souza-Rodrigues (2017, 2019).4
We rely heavily on Kalouptsidi, Scott, and Souza-Rodrigues (2019) (henceforth ‘KSS’), which provides the
necessary and sufficient conditions for point identification of a broad class of counterfactuals encountered in
applied work. The closest paper to ours is by Norets and Tang (2014), who consider binary choice models,
relax the assumption that the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks is known by the econometrician, and
obtain partial identification results for structural parameters and for (high-dimensional) counterfactual
choice probabilities. They focus on two types of counterfactuals – pre-specified additive changes in payoffs
and changes to state transitions – and propose a Bayesian approach to inference, based on Markov Chain
2Important early contributions include Miller (1984), Wolpin (1984), and Pakes (1986).
3Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) two-step estimator is the first to allow for partially-identified model parameters.
Dickstein and Morales (2018) and Morales, Sheu, and Zahler (2019) pioneered the use of Euler-equation-like estimators
for DDC models using moment inequalities, requiring minimal distributional assumptions on the error term. Berry and
Compiani (2019) allow for serially correlated unobserved states and propose the use of lagged state variables as instrumental
variables for (econometrically) endogenous states, for models with both continuous and discrete actions, and obtain partial
identification of structural parameters in a discrete choice setting.
4Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014), Norets and Tang (2014), and Arcidiacono and Miller (2018) have established the
identification of two important categories of counterfactuals in different classes of DDC models: counterfactual behavior
is identified when flow payoffs change additively by pre-specified amounts; counterfactual behavior is generally not iden-
tified when the state transition process changes. Kalouptsidi, Scott, and Souza-Rodrigues (2017) discuss identification of
counterfactual best-reply functions and equilibria in dynamic games.
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Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. Compared to Norets and Tang (2014), we assume that the distribution
of the unobservables is known, which is common in practice and allows us to characterize the properties of
the identified sets analytically, but we consider a broader class of counterfactual experiments. Moreover,
our approach for inference is based on subsampling and is guaranteed to be uniformly valid asymptotically,
in contrast to Bayesian inference, which is known to be only pointwise valid asymptotically (see, e.g., the
discussion in Canay and Shaikh, 2017). Further, differently from Norets and Tang (2014), we focus on
confidence sets for low-dimensional outcomes of interest, which are often what researchers are mostly
interested in. Developing inference procedures for such objects is not trivial as they involve nonlinear
functions of model parameters and counterfactual choice probabilities.
Our inference approach builds on the formulation developed in Kitamura and Stoye (2018), where the
implications of economic models are expressed in terms of the minimum value of a quadratic form. The
associated quadratic form-based algorithm offers computational advantages, and it also provides a useful
framework for asymptotic analysis, especially when asymptotic uniform validity is an important issue.
Our model restriction has non-regular features in terms of smoothness, and is thus connected to a large
literature initiated by Chernoff’s (1954) study of non-regular statistical models, namely, the asymptotic
behavior of the minimum distance of a random object to a fixed manifold with possible kinks. In contrast
to this literature, we consider the minimum distance to a kinked (i.e., non-regular) and random (estimated)
and possibly nonconvex set. We avoid standard convexity conditions, even locally, on such objects because
they are typically incompatible with our model restrictions.5 We establish that an appropriate application
of subsampling to the quadratic-form-based distance measure yields an asymptotically valid algorithm for
inference.6
Finally, a recent and increasingly influential line of research emphasizes that (partial) identification
of potential effects of policy interventions does not necessarily require identification of all the model
parameters. Major contributions outside the class of structural dynamic models include Ichimura and
Taber (2000, 2002) and Mogstad, Santos, and Torgovitsky (2018) for selection models; Manski (2007)
for static choice models under counterfactual choice sets; Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2008),
Blundell, Kristensen, and Matzkin (2014), Kitamura and Stoye (2019), and Adams (2020) for bounds
on counterfactual demand distributions and welfare analysis; Adao, Costinot, and Donaldson (2017)
for international trade models; and Bejara (2018) for macroeconomic models. All these approaches,
including ours, are consistent with Marschak’s (1953) advocacy of solving well-posed economic problems
with minimal assumptions. See Heckman (2000, 2010) for excellent discussions of Marschak’s approach
to identification in structural models.
5Note that Kitamura and Stoye (2018) deal with the case where a random vector is projected on a non-smooth but fixed
object with some desirable geometric features. They then show that a bootstrap procedure combined with what they call
the tightening technique leads to a computationally efficient algorithm with asymptotic uniform validity.
6Asymptotic validity of subsampling in nonregular models with more conventional settings, such as standard moment
inequality models, have been shown in the literature: see Romano and Shaikh (2008) and Romano and Shaikh (2012).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets out the dynamic discrete choice framework;
Section 3 presents the partial identification results for the model parameters, then illustrates the identified
set under alternative restrictions in the context of a firm entry/exit problem; Section 4 contains our main
results regarding the set-identification of counterfactuals; Section 5 establishes uniformly valid confidence
sets for target parameters; Section 6 presents the empirical application involving export supply and
subsidies; and Section 7 concludes.7
2 Dynamic Model
In the model, time is discrete and the time horizon is infinite. Every period t, agent i observes the state sit




βτπ (ait+τ , sit+τ ) | ait, sit
 ,
where π (·) is the per period payoff function, and β ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor. The agent’s state
sit follows a controlled Markov process. We follow the literature and assume that sit is split into two
components, sit = (xit, εit), where xit is observed by the econometrician and εit is not. We assume
xit ∈ X = {1, ..., X}, X < ∞; while εit = (ε0it, ..., εAit) is i.i.d. across agents and time, and has joint
distribution G that is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and has full support
on RA+1.8
The transition distribution function for (xit, εit) factors as
F
(







and the payoff function is additively separable in the unobservables,
π (a, xit, εit) = πa (xit) + εait,
where πa(x) is a bounded function. Let V (xit, εit) be the expected discounted stream of payoffs under
7The Supplemental Material and the Online Appendix complement the main paper. The Supplemental Material contains
(a) all proofs of the propositions and theorems presented in the main text; (b) detailed information about our running example
(the firm entry/exit problem); (c) our Monte Carlo study; and (d) our replication of Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007). The
Online Appendix presents (e) several useful examples of commonly employed restrictions in applied work (using our notation);
(f) the computational algorithm for inference based on subsampling; (g) how to calculate the gradient of the object of interest
when it involves long-run average effects; and (h) our proposed stochastic search approach to calculate the lower and upper
bounds of the identified set of relevant outcomes, without analytic gradients. The Online Appendix is available on the
authors’ webpages.
8Our results cover static discrete choice models, and can be extended to dynamic models with continuous states, nonsta-
tionarity, and that are finite-horizon. Such extensions are however beyond the scope of the paper.
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optimal behavior by the agent. By Bellman’s principle of optimality,
V (xit, εit) = max
a∈A
{
πa (xit) + εait + β E
[
V (xit+1, εit+1) |a, xit
]}
.
Following the literature, we define the ex ante value function, V (xit) ≡
∫
V (xit, εit) dG (εit), and the
conditional value function:
va (xit) ≡ πa (xit) + β E
[
V (xit+1) |a, xit
]
.
The ex ante value function takes the expectation of the value function with respect to εit. The conditional
value function is the sum of the agent’s current payoff, net of the idiosyncratic shocks εit, and the expected
lifetime payoff given a choice of action a this period and optimal choices from next period onwards.





va (xit) + εait ≥ vj (xit) + εjit, for all j ∈ A
}
dG (εit) ,
where 1 {·} is the indicator function. We define the (A+ 1)× 1 vector of conditional choice probabilities
p (x) = (p0 (x) , ..., pA (x))
′, and the corresponding (A+ 1)X × 1 vector p = (p′ (1) , ..., p′ (X))′, where ′
denotes transpose.
It is useful to note that for any (a, x) there exists a real-valued function ψa (.) derived only from G
such that





Equation (1) states that the ex ante value function V equals the value obtained by choosing a today and
optimally thereafter, va, plus a correction term, ψa, because choosing action a today is not necessarily
optimal. When εit follows the type I extreme value distribution, ψa(p (x)) = κ− ln pa (x), where κ is the
Euler constant.9
As we make extensive use of matrix notation below, we define the vectors πa, va, V, ψa ∈ RX , which
stack πa (x), va (x), V (x), and ψa(p (x)), for all x ∈ X . We often use the notation ψa(p) to emphasize the
dependence of ψa on the choice probabilities p. We also define Fa as the transition matrix with (m,n)
element equal to Pr
(
xit+1 = xn|xit = xm, a
)
. The payoff vector π ∈ R(A+1)X stacks πa for all a ∈ A, and,
similarly, F stacks (a vectorized version) of Fa for all a ∈ A.
9Equation (1) is shown in Arcidiacono and Miller (2011, Lemma 1). It makes use of the Hotz-Miller inversion (Hotz
and Miller, 1993), which, in turn, establishes that the difference of conditional value functions is a known function of the




, where φaj (.) is again derived only from G. When εit follows the type I extreme value
distribution, φaj(p (x)) = log pa (x) − log pj (x). Chiong, Galichon, and Shum (2016) propose a novel approach that can
calculate ψa and φaj for a broad set of distributions G (see also Dearing, 2019).
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3 Model Restrictions and Identification
In this section, we characterize the identified set of the model parameters, allowing for additional model
restrictions that the researcher may be willing to impose, and we illustrate the sets in the context of a
firm entry/exit problem.
The primitives of the model are (A,X , β,G, F, π), which generate the endogenous objects {pa, va, V :
a ∈ A}. Typically, the researcher has access to a panel data on agents’ actions and states, {ait, xit :
i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T}. Under some standard regularity conditions, the researcher can identify and
estimate the agents’ choice probabilities pa (x), as well as the transition distribution function F , directly
from the data. We therefore take p and F as known for the identification arguments. We also follow
the literature and assume the econometrician knows the discount factor β and the distribution of the
idiosyncratic shocks G (we discuss these assumptions in Remark 3 below). The main objective here is to
identify the payoff function π.
The model is identified if there is a unique payoff that can be inferred from the observed choice
probabilities and state transitions. Intuitively, π has (A+1)X parameters, and there are only AX observed
CCPs; thus there are X free payoff parameters and X restrictions will need to be imposed to point-identify
π (Rust, 1994; Magnac and Thesmar, 2002). We follow KSS to represent the underidentification problem
as follows: for all a 6= J , where J ∈ A is some reference action, πa can be represented as an affine
transformation of πJ :
10
πa = MaπJ + ba (p) , (2)
where
Ma = (I − βFa) (I − βFJ)−1 , (3)
ba (p) = MaψJ (p)− ψa (p) , (4)
and I is a (comformable) identity matrix. In the logit model, ba (p) = ln pa −Ma ln pJ , where ln pa is the
X × 1 vector with elements ln pa(x). To simplify notation, we omit the dependence of both Ma and ba(p)
on the transition probabilities F .
We rely heavily on equation (2). Given the data at hand, one can compute both the X×X matrix Ma
and the X × 1 vector ba directly for each action a 6= J . The payoffs πa, a 6= J , are not identified because
the free parameter πJ is unknown. Equation (2) therefore explicitly lays out how we might estimate
10To see why, fix the vector πJ ∈ RX . Then,
πa = va − βFaV = V − ψa − βFaV = (I − βFa)V − ψa,
where for a = J , we have V = (I − βFJ)−1 (πJ + ψJ). After substituting for V , we obtain the result. As an aside, note
that (I − βFJ) is invertible because FJ is a stochastic matrix and hence the largest eigenvalue is equal or smaller than one.
The eigenvalues of (I − βFJ) are given by 1 − βγ, where γ are the eigenvalues of FJ . Because β < 1 and γ ≤ 1, we have
1− βγ > 0.
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the payoff function if we are willing to fix the payoffs of one action at all states a priori (e.g. πJ = 0).
However, this is not the only way to obtain identification: we simply need to add X extra restrictions.
Other common possibilities involve reducing the number of payoff function parameters to be estimated
using parametric assumptions and/or exclusions restrictions.
It will be useful to represent (2) for all actions a 6= J at once using two different compact notations.
First,
π−J = M−JπJ + b−J , (5)
where π−J stacks πa for all a 6= J , and the matrix M−J and vector b−J are defined similarly.11 Further,
define M = [I,−M−J ], and arrange π in the following way: π = [π′−J , π′J ]′. Then (5) becomes
Mπ = b−J . (6)
Note that identification of π fails because M is rank-deficient; indeed, M is an AX × (A + 1)X matrix,
and so rank(M) = AX < (A+ 1)X. In short, equation (6) summarizes all assumptions imposed by the
basic dynamic framework: any π ∈ R(A+1)X satisfying (6) is compatible with the data.12
Remark 1. (Static Models) Equation (2) also holds in static models. When agents are myopic (β = 0)
or when choices do not affect the transition of states (Fa = FJ , for all a 6= J), the matrix Ma becomes
the identity matrix, implying that the difference in payoffs πa − πJ is identified: it equals ψJ(p)− ψa(p);
in the logit model, that differencce equals the log odds ratio of the choice probabilities. All results we
present in this paper naturally cover the class of static discrete choice models.
3.1 Model Restrictions
We consider two types of model restrictions. The first is a set of d ≤ X linearly independent equalities,
Reqπ = req, (7)
with Req ∈ Rd×(A+1)X , or in block-form, Req = [Req−J , R
eq
J ], where R
eq
−J defines how π−J enters into
the constraints and, similarly, ReqJ for πJ . This formulation is general enough to incorporate several
assumptions used in practice. Examples include exclusion restrictions (setting some elements of π equal
to each other), prespecifying some πJ (set R
eq
J = I, R
eq
−J = 0 and r
eq accordingly), and parametric
assumptions such as πa(x) = za(x)γ, where za is some known function of actions and states, and γ ∈
Γ ⊂ RL is a parameter vector in the parameter space Γ, with dimension L usually much smaller than
11The vectors π−J and b−J have dimension AX × 1, while M−J is an AX ×X matrix.
12This model imposes a scale normalization. In general, the payoff function is given by π(a, xit, εit) = πa(xit) + σεait,
where σ > 0 is a scale parameter. This means equation (6) is given by M (π/σ) = b−J . As usual in discrete choice models,




The second set of restrictions are m linear inequalities:
Riqπ ≤ riq, (8)
with Riq ∈ Rm×(A+1)X , or in block-form, Riq = [Riq−J , R
iq
J ]. The inequalities (8) can incorporate shape
restrictions, such as monotonicity, concavity, and supermodularity. In Online Appendix E, we explicitly
lay out how several examples of assumptions used in applied work can be expressed as (7) or (8).
We assume the restrictions (7) and (8) are not redundant. Equations (6), (7), and (8) summarize
therefore all model restrictions.
3.2 Model Identification
The identified set for the payoff function is characterized by all payoffs satisfying all model restrictions.
Our first proposition follows (all proofs are in the Supplemental Material).
Proposition 1. The sharp identified set for the payoff function π is
ΠI =
{
π ∈ R(A+1)X : Mπ = b−J , Reqπ = req, Riqπ ≤ riq
}
. (9)
The identified set ΠI is a convex polyhedron of dimension X − d, where 0 ≤ d ≤ X.
The identified set is sharp by construction.14 It is a convex polyhedron because it is the intersection
of finitely many closed halfspaces. Note that ΠI can be characterized in practice by linear programming
or convex programming methods. In the absence of inequalities (8), the identified set becomes a linear
manifold with dimension X−d; and it collapses to a singleton (i.e., π is point-identified) when the matrix[
M′, Req′
]′
is full rank (Magnac and Thesmar, 2002; Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, 2008).15
Before proceeding, remarks regarding unobserved heterogeneity, and the assumption of known β and
G are in order.
Remark 2. (Unobserved Heterogeneity.) In the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, equations (6)–(8)
hold for each unobserved type. This implies that, after type-specific choice probabilities and transition
functions of finitely many unobserved types are identified (e.g., following the strategies proposed by
13To see this, note that π = zγ, where z is a known matrix of dimension (A+ 1)X × L, γ is a column vector L× 1, and
we assume (A+ 1)X > L. Decompose the long (A+ 1)X vector π into an upper part πu and a lower part πl, and define zu
and zl similarly. Then, πu = zuγ and πl = zlγ. Suppose the decomposition is such that zu has full column rank. Then, from
















14A sharp identified set is the smallest set of parameter values that can generate the data.
15If we impose a linear-in-parameters restriction on flow payoffs, π = zγ, we can write the identified set for γ in a similar
way: ΓI = { γ ∈ Γ : (Mz) γ = b−J , (Reqz)γ = req, (Riqz)γ ≤ riq }.
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Kasahara and Shimotsu (2009) or Hu and Shum (2012)), identified sets given by (9) hold, and can be
calculated, for each type.
Remark 3. (Unknown β and G.) Although we assume a known discount factor, it is straightforward
to extend our analysis by either making use of the contributions by Magnac and Thesmar (2002) and
Abbring and Daljord (2019) to identify β, or by indexing ΠI by β and taking the identified set for π as
the union of the sets ΠI(β)’s for all admissible discount factors. Similarly, Blevins (2014), Chen (2017),
and Buchholz, Shum, and Xu (2019) consider identification of G under different model assumptions. One
can combine their assumptions to identify G and ΠI simultaneously, or take the union of the sets ΠI(G)
for admissible distributions G as the identified set ΠI ; see also Christensen and Connault (2019). Note
however that the union of such sets (either ΠI(β) or ΠI(G)) is not necessarily a convex polyhedron.
3.3 Example: Firm Entry/Exit Model
Next, we illustrate the payoff identified set in the context of a simple firm entry/exit problem. Suppose
a firm i decides whether to enter the market (a = 1) or stay out (a = 0), so that A = {0, 1}. Decompose
the state space into xit = (kit, wit), where kit ∈ K = {0, 1} is the lagged decision ait−1, and wit ∈ W =
{1, ...,W} are exogenous shocks determining profits. Assume for convenience (unless otherwise stated)
that wit can take two values, low and high: W = {wl, wh}, with wl < wh. The size of the state space is
therefore X = KW = 4, where K and W are the number of values that k and w can take. Transition
probabilities decompose as F (kit+1, wit+1|ait, kit, wit) = F (kit+1|ait, kit)F (wit+1|wit).
Let πa(k) denote the W × 1 vector of payoffs the firm obtains when it chooses action a given k and
w, so that πa = [π
′
a (0) , π
′
a (1)]




 , π1 =
 vp− fc− ec
vp− fc
 . (10)
The payoff the firm obtains when it was out of the market in the previous period and stays out in the
current period is the vector π0 (0) = π0 (the value of the outside option); and the payoff when the firm
was active and decides to exit is given by the vector of scrap values, π0 (1) = s. Note that both the
outside option and the scrap values can vary with the exogenous state w. The vectors vp, fc, and ec are
the variable profits, the fixed costs, and the entry costs, respectively (all of which can vary with w as
well). The vector π1 (0) = vp− fc− ec measures the profits the firm gets when it enters the market, and
π1 (1) = vp− fc are the profits when it stays.
In this example, both π0 and π1 are 4×1 vectors (and so π has 2X = 8 elements). To point-identify π
we need X = 4 restrictions. Typically, researchers identify an entry model by setting π0 = 0 and further
setting either s = 0 or assuming vp− fc is known (e.g., by assuming variable profits vp can be recovered
“offline,” using price and quantity data, and setting fc = 0). When π0 = s = 0, then π0 = 0, and point
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identification of π follows directly from (2); it is essentially a restriction on a reference action. When
instead π0 = 0 and vp− fc is known, we identify the remaining elements of π by combining (2) and (7).
Assuming the outside option equals the scrap value or the fixed costs (and all are equal to zero) may
be difficult to justify in practice, as cost or scrap value data are extremely rare (Kalouptsidi, 2014). When
the researcher is not willing to impose such restrictions, π is not point-identified. Yet, the payoff function
can be set-identified under weaker conditions. Consider, for instance, the following set of assumptions:
1. π0 = 0, fc ≥ 0, ec ≥ 0, and vp is known.
2. π1(1, w
h) ≥ π1(1, wl), and vp− fc ≤ ec ≤ E[vp−fc]1−β , where the expectation is taken over the ergodic
distribution of the state variables.
3. s does not depend on w.
Restriction 1 assumes that the outside option is zero (as usual); fixed costs and entry costs are both
positive; and variable profits are known (estimated “offline”). This set of restrictions imposes d = W = 2
equality and m = 4 inequality constraints. From Proposition 1, the identified set ΠI is a two-dimensional
set (X − d = 2) in the eight-dimensional space.
Restriction 2 imposes m = 5 inequality constraints: profits are increasing in w when the firm is in
the market (a monotonicity assumption); entry costs are greater than variable profits minus fixed costs
(implying that entry is always costly in the first period of entry); and ec is smaller than the expected
present value of future profits when the firm stays forever in the market (meaning that it eventually pays
off to enter).
Restriction 3 assumes an exclusion restriction: scrap values are state-invariant. This corresponds to
d = W − 1 = 1 equality restriction. Note that, by combining Restrictions 1 and 3, we obtain d = 3 linear
equalities, which makes the identified set ΠI one dimensional. In the Supplemental Material (Section B),
we provide explicit characterizations for this example.
Figure 1 presents ΠI for a particular parameter configuration.16 The larger polyhedron corresponds to
ΠI under Restriction 1. The identified set is informative despite the fact that the assumptions imposed are
not overly restrictive. To gain intuition regarding the shape of ΠI , consider the set corresponding to scrap
values (panel (b)). In this model, equation (6) alone implies that the difference between scrap values and
entry costs is point-identified (see Supplemental Material, Section B). As a consequence, the inequality
ec ≥ 0 implies a lower bound on scrap values (for each state w), eliminating from ΠI all values for s
below the thresholds indicated in the figure. Similarly, equation (6) implies that the difference between s
and the present value of fixed costs is point-identified. In this second case, though, the inequality fc ≥ 0
16We assume scrap values, entry and fixed costs do not depend on w and take the following values: s = 4.5, ec = 5, and
fc = 0.5. We also impose vp(wl) = 2 and vp(wh) = 4, so that π0 = (0, 0, 4.5, 4.5)
′ and π1 = (−3.5,−1.5, 1.5, 3.5)′. The
discount factor is β = 0.9, the transition process for w is Pr(wt+1 = w
l|wt = wl) = Pr(wt+1 = wh|wt = wh) = 0.75, and




(a) Payoff when Stay Out, π0(0) (b) Payoff when Exit, π0(1)
(c) Payoff when Enter, π1(0) (d) Payoff when Stay In, π1(1)
Figure 1: Firm Entry/Exit Model: Payoff Identified Set ΠI under Restrictions 1, 2, and 3. The larger polyhedron
(including the dark blue areas) correspond to ΠI under Restriction 1. The light blue areas correspond to ΠI under
Restrictions 1 and 2. The identified set ΠI under Restrictions 1–3 is represented by the blue lines within the light
blue polyhedron. The true π is represented by the black dots.
entails an upper bound on scrap values, eliminating from the identified set all values for s above the
diagonal lines shown in the figure. The diagonal lines reflect the fact that equation (6) relates s and the
present value of fc, so that fc ≥ 0 leads to restrictions on scrap values across states.
Restrictions 1 and 2 together lead to substantial identifying power: ΠI now corresponds to the smaller
polyhedron (in light blue), which is substantially smaller in size than the larger polyhedron. Assuming
that entry is costly in the first period of entry, vp − fc ≤ ec, is the main restriction responsible for the
reduction in the identified set. This assumption results in another lower bound on s (see panel (b)), but
differently from ec ≥ 0, it involves restrictions on fc and so imposes restrictions on s across states; the
other assumptions in Restriction 2 are not as informative in this example; see the Supplemental Material.
Interestingly, the payoff function with scrap values that are equal to zero does not belong to ΠI under
these two sets of restrictions. As mentioned previously, setting scrap values to zero is a common way to
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point-identify π, but, given that s = 0 is at odds with Restrictions 1 and 2, such assumption would be
rejected by the data.
Finally, Restriction 3 (exclusion restriction on scrap values) also has substantial identifying power as
it reduces the dimension of the identified set to one. In the figures, the identified set under Restrictions
1–3 is represented by the blue lines within the light blue polyhedron.
4 Counterfactuals and Outcomes of Interest
The applied literature has implemented several types of counterfactuals that may change one or several
of the model’s primitives (A,X , β, F,G, π). For instance, a counterfactual may change the action and
state spaces (e.g. Gilleskie (1998) restricts access to medical care; Crawford and Shum (2005) do not
allow patients to switch medications; Keane and Wolpin (2010) eliminate a welfare program; Keane
and Merlo (2010) eliminate job options for politicians; Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) add an insurance
option for farmers). Some counterfactuals may transform the state transitions (e.g. Collard-Wexler (2013)
explores the impact of demand volatility in the ready-mix concrete industry; Hendel and Nevo (2006)
study consumers’ long-run responsiveness to prices using supermarket scanner data; Kalouptsidi (2014)
explores the impact of time to build on industry fluctuations). Other counterfactuals change payoffs
through subsidies or taxes (e.g. Keane and Wolpin (1997) consider hypothetical college tuition subsidies;
Schiraldi (2011) and Wei and Li (2014), automobile scrap subsidies; Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan (2012),
bonus incentives for teachers; Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007), export subsidies; Lin (2015) and Varela
(2018), entry subsidies). Changes in payoffs may also involve a change in the agent’s “type” (e.g. Keane
and Wolpin (2010) replace the primitives of minorities by those of white women; Eckstein and Lifshitz
(2011) substitute the preference/costs parameters of one cohort by those of another; Ryan (2012) replaces
firm entry costs post an environmental policy by those before; Dunne, Klimek, Roberts, and Xu (2013)
substitute entry costs in some areas by those in others). Finally, a counterfactual may also change the
discount factor (e.g., Conlon (2012) studies the evolution of the LCD TV industry when consumers become
myopic).
A counterfactual is defined by the tuple {Ã, X̃ , β̃, G̃, hs, h}. The sets Ã = {0, ..., Ã} and X̃ = {1, ..., X̃}
denote the new set of actions and states respectively. The new discount factor is β̃, and the new distri-
bution of the idiosyncratic shocks is G̃. The function hs : RA×X2 → RÃ×X̃2 transforms the transition
probability F into F̃ . Finally, the function h : RAX → RÃX̃ transforms the payoff function π into the
counterfactual payoff π̃, so that π̃ = h (π). Here, we restrict transformations on payoffs to affine changes
π̃ = Hπ + g, where the matrix H and the vector g are specified by the econometrician. I.e., the payoff
π̃a(x) at an action-state pair (a, x) is obtained as the sum of a scalar ga(x) and a linear combination of
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all baseline payoffs. It is helpful to write this in a block-matrix equivalent form:
π̃ =
























where the submatrices Haj have dimension X̃ ×X for each pair a ∈ Ã and j ∈ A. Note that when the
counterfactual does not change the set of actions and states (i.e. Ã = A and X̃ = X ), H is a square
matrix.
The counterfactual {Ã, X̃ , β̃, G̃, hs, h} generates a new set of model primitives (Ã, X̃ , β̃, G̃, F̃ , π̃). The
new set of primitives in turn leads to a new optimal behavior, denoted by p̃ (the counterfactual CCP),
and a new lifetime utility, denoted by Ṽ (the counterfactual welfare).
As the state space X can be large in practice (making both p̃ and Ṽ high-dimensional vectors), re-
searchers are often interested in low-dimensional objects, such as the average effects of policy interventions.
For instance, in the firm entry/exit application, one may be interested in predicting the average effects of
an entry subsidy on: (i) how often the firm stays in the market; (ii) prices; (iii) consumer surplus; (iv) the
value of the firm; and/or (v) total government expenditures, among others. Denote the low-dimensional
counterfactual outcome of interest by θ ∈ Θ ⊂ Rn, where Θ is the parameter space for θ, and n is much
smaller than the size of the state space X (i.e., n X). Then, we have
θ = f (p̃, π; p, F ) , (12)
where f implicitly incorporates other quantities that may be necessary to calculate θ, such as Ã or F̃ .
For instance, take an outcome variable of interest Ya (x) (e.g., consumer surplus, or the probability of
entry), with a corresponding counterfactual given by Ỹa (x). The average treatment effect of the policy
intervention on Y is
θ = E[Ỹa (x)]− E[Ya (x)], (13)
where E[Ỹa (x)] integrates over the distribution of actions and states in the counterfactual scenario, while
E[Ya (x)] integrates over the factual distribution. One may consider the long-run distribution, or may
condition on an initial state and estimate short-run effects. (See the Supplemental Material for details.)
4.1 Identification of Counterfactual Behavior
We now investigate the identified set for the counterfactual CCP p̃. To do so, we leverage the counterfac-
tual counterpart to (2) for any action a ∈ Ã, with a 6= J . I.e.,
π̃a = M̃a π̃J + b̃a (p̃) , (14)
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where
M̃a = (I − β̃F̃a) (I − β̃F̃J)−1,
b̃a (p̃) = M̃a ψ̃J (p̃)− ψ̃a (p̃) ,
the functions ψ̃J and ψ̃a depend on the new distribution G̃, and, without loss of generality, the reference
action J belongs to both A and Ã. As before, we omit the dependence of both M̃a and b̃a on the transition
probabilities F̃ to simplify notation.
By stacking equation (14) for all actions and rearranging it (as done previously for the baseline case),
we obtain M̃ π̃ = b̃−J , where M̃ = [I,−M̃−J ], I is an identity matrix, and M̃−J and b̃−J stack M̃a and
b̃a, for all a 6= J , respectively. Next, using the fact that π̃ = Hπ + g, we get
(M̃H)π = b̃−J (p̃)− M̃g. (15)
Equation (15) characterizes counterfactual behavior, relating p̃ and model parameters directly, with
no continuation values involved.17 Importantly, the function b̃−J is continuously differentiable with an
everywhere invertible Jacobian (see Lemma 1 in KSS). The next proposition follows:
Proposition 2. The sharp identified set for the counterfactual CCP p̃ is
P̃I =

p̃ ∈ P̃ : ∃π ∈ R(A+1)X such that
Mπ = b−J(p),
Reqπ = req, Riqπ ≤ riq,
(M̃H)π = b̃−J (p̃)− M̃g

, (16)
where P̃ is the simplex of conditional choice probabilities.
In words, a vector p̃ lying in the conditional probability simplex P̃ belongs to the identified set P̃I if
there exists a payoff π that is compatible with the data (i.e., Mπ = b−J), satisfies the additional model
restrictions (i.e., Reqπ = req and Riqπ ≤ riq), and can generate p̃ in the counterfactual scenario (i.e.,
(M̃H)π = b̃−J (p̃)− M̃g).18
Next, we derive the analytical properties of the identified set P̃I . To that end, we represent the matrix
17The CCP vector generated by the model primitives is the unique vector that satisfies (6): since the Bellman is a
contraction mapping, V is unique; from the definition of the conditional value function, we conclude that so are va and thus
so is p (see the argument presented in footnote 10, which leads to equation (6)). The same reasoning applies to p̃ in (15).
18Counterfactuals involving nonlinear transformations on π change the identified set P̃I defined in (16) by replacing
equation (15) by M̃h(π) = b̃−J (p̃). We ignore such counterfactuals because they are uncommon in empirical work (such
counterfactuals are considered in KSS); however, extensions to nonlinear transformations are straightforward.
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H in the following way:19




Proposition 3. The identified set P̃I has the following properties:
(i) It is empty if and only if ΠI is empty.
(ii) It is a connected manifold with boundary, and dimension in the interior given by the rank of the
matrix C(I − PQ), where
C = H1,−JM−J − M̃−JH2,−JM−J +H1J − M̃−JH2J , (17)
and PQ = Q
eq′ (QeqQeq′)−1Qeq, with
Qeq = Req−JM−J +R
eq
J , (18)
and Req = [Req−J , R
eq
J ]. Furthermore, rank(C(I − PQ)) ≤ X − d.
(iii) It is compact when ΠI is bounded.
(iv) In the absence of equality restrictions (7), the dimension of P̃I is given by the rank of C.20
Intuitively, equation (15) implicitly defines p̃ as a continuously differentiable function of π. The sharp
identified set P̃I is therefore the image of ΠI under this function. It is clear that P̃I is empty whenever
ΠI is empty (i.e., whenever the model is rejected in the data); P̃I is connected because ΠI is convex;
and P̃I is compact when ΠI is bounded (recall that ΠI is closed). An implication of the connectedness
of the identified set is that a non-empty P̃I is either a singleton (in which case p̃ is point-identified) or a
continuum.
Proposition 3 also states that P̃I is a manifold whose dimension is given by the rank of the matrix
C(I−PQ), which is smaller than or equal to X−d. The fact that P̃I cannot have dimension greater than
X − d is intuitive: since P̃I is the image set of a function defined on a (X − d)–dimensional polyhedron,
p̃ is specified by at most X − d degrees of freedom rather than by X̃Ã: once X − d elements are specified,
the remaining are found from (15). So, whenever X − d < X̃Ã, the dimension of the identified set P̃I
is strictly smaller than the dimension of the conditional probability simplex P̃, which implies that the
(Lebesgue) measure of P̃I on P̃ is zero. In other words, the identified set P̃I is informative.
The rank of C(I − PQ) can be strictly smaller than X − d. The exact value depends on (i) the
counterfactual transformation (which affects the matrix C, through the elements of H and M̃−J , defined
by the econometrician), (ii) the model restrictions (which affect PQ, through Q
eq, which in turn depends
19Note that π̃ = Hπ + g = H−Jπ−J +HJπJ + g. The matrix H−J has dimension (Ã+ 1)X̃ ×AX, with the submatrices
H1,−J (with dimension ÃX̃ × AX) and H2,−J (with dimension X̃ × AX). Similarly, HJ is an (Ã + 1)X̃ ×X matrix with
the submatrices H1J (with dimension ÃX̃ ×X) and H2J (with dimension X̃ ×X).
20The matrix C has dimension ÃX̃ ×X, while Qeq is a d×X matrix, and both PQ and (I − PQ) are X ×X matrices.
18
on the linear restrictions Req), and (iii) the data (particularly, on state transitions F , which are part of
the matrix M−J – see equation (3) – and possibly part of M̃−J through F̃ = h
s(F )). The interaction
of these factors can reduce the dimension of the identified set further beyond X − d. Of note, once the
econometrician establishes the counterfactual of interest and the model restrictions, the rank of C(I−PQ)
can be verified directly from the data.
When rank(C(I−PQ)) = 0, the identified set P̃I collapses into a singleton – i.e., p̃ is point-identified.
This means that all points π ∈ ΠI map onto the same counterfactual CCP. Putting differently, even
though the model restrictions do not suffice to point identify the model parameters, they may suffice to
identify counterfactual behavior.
4.2 Identification of Counterfactual Outcomes of Interest
We now investigate the identified set of low-dimensional outcomes of interest θ ∈ Θ ⊂ Rn.
Proposition 4. The sharp identified set for θ is
ΘI =

θ ∈ Θ : ∃ (p̃, π) ∈ P̃× R(A+1)X such that
θ = f (p̃, π; p, F ) , Mπ = b−J(p),
Reqπ = req, Riqπ ≤ riq,
(M̃H)π = b̃−J (p̃)− M̃g

. (19)
When f is a continuous function of (p̃, π), ΘI is a connected set. In addition, if θ is a scalar, then ΘI
is an interval. Finally, when ΠI is bounded, ΘI is compact.
Proposition 4 states that a vector θ belongs to ΘI if and only if there exists a payoff π that is compatible
with the data (i.e., Mπ = b−J), satisfies the model restrictions (i.e., R
eqπ = req and Riqπ ≤ riq), can
generate p̃ in the counterfactual scenario (i.e., (M̃H)π = b̃−J (p̃)−M̃g), and the corresponding pair (p̃, π)
can generate θ (i.e., θ = f (p̃, π; p, F )).
When f is continuous, ΘI is connected because it is the image set of a (composite) continuous function
defined on the convex polyhedron ΠI . If the model restrictions make ΠI bounded, ΘI becomes a compact
and connected set, which is convenient as it suffices to trace the boundary of ΘI to characterize this set
in practice. In addition, when θ is a scalar, ΘI reduces to a compact interval, which is even simpler to
characterize: in that case we just need to compute the lower and upper endpoints of the interval ΘI .








Req π = req, (21)
Riq π ≤ riq,
(M̃H)π = b̃−J (p̃)− M̃g.
The lower bound of the identified set θL is defined similarly (but replacing max by min). For ease of
exposition, we focus on the maximization problem hereafter.
The problem (20)–(21) is a nonlinear maximization problem with linear constraints on π and smooth
nonlinear constraints on p̃. When f is differentiable, the optimization can be solved using standard
software (e.g., Knitro).
In our experience, standard algorithms are highly efficient in solving (20)–(21) in empirically-relevant
high-dimensional problems when the researcher provides the gradient of f . In some cases, however, the
gradient of f may be nontrivial to compute; for instance this is the case when the target parameter θ
involves counterfactual average effects based on the ergodic distributions of the states, as in equation (13).
For such cases, we show in Online Appendix G how to calculate the gradient of f analytically to help the
numerical search. In other cases, when numerical gradients are costly to evaluate, standard solvers can
be slow to converge. We thus develop a stochastic algorithm that exploits the structure of the problem
(20)–(21) and combines the strengths of alternative stochastic search procedures. We discuss and describe
our proposed algorithm in Online Appendix H.
4.3 Example: Firm Entry/Exit Model (Continued)
To illustrate the shape and size of the identified sets P̃I and ΘI , we now return to the firm example. Let
the baseline CCP be p = (p′1(0), p
′
1(1))
′, where p1(k) is the W × 1 vector with the probabilities of being
active (a = 1) given k and w. Assuming the exogenous shocks can take only two values, low and high,
and taking the same parameter values used in the construction of Figure 1, the baseline CCP is given by
the vector p = (0.714, 0.951, 0.804, 0.970)′: the probability of entry in the low state is p1(0, w
l) = 0.714,
while the probability of entry in high state is p1(0, w
h) = 0.951. We observe a higher probability of entry
in the high state because higher values of w lead to greater profits and because w follows a persistent
Markov process. Similarly, the probability of staying in the market in the low state is p1(1, w
l) = 0.804,
while the probability of staying in the high state is p1(1, w
h) = 0.970.
The counterfactual experiment we consider in this example is a subsidy that decreases entry cost by
20%. Formally, π̃ = Hπ + g, with g = 0, and H block-diagonal with the diagonal blocks H00 and H11
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given by




where τ = 0.8. This implies
π̃0 = H00π0 = π0, and π̃1 = H11π1 =
 vp− fc− τ × ec
vp− fc
 .
The counterfactual CCP is p̃ = (0.768, 0.960, 0.668, 0.934)′. As expected, the subsidy increases the
probability of entry compared to the baseline in both low and high states w. The subsidy also decreases
the probability of staying in the market, as it becomes cheaper to re-enter in the future.
(a) Probability of Entry, p̃1(0, w) (b) Probability of Stay, p̃1(1, w)
(c) Zoom: Probability of Entry, p̃1(0, w) (d) Zoom: Probability of Stay, p̃1(1, w)
Figure 2: Identified Set for Counterfactual CCPs, P̃I , under Restrictions 1, 2, and 3. The larger sets (including
the dark blue areas) correspond to P̃I under Restriction 1. The light blue areas correspond to P̃I under Restrictions
1 and 2. The identified set P̃I under Restrictions 1–3 is represented by the blue lines within the light blue areas.
The baseline and counterfactual CCPs, p and p̃, are represented by the black empty circle and the black full dot,
respectively. The bottom panels present the “zoomed-in” versions of the top panels.
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We now characterize the identified set P̃I under Restrictions 1–3. Figure 2 presents the results.
Similar to our representation of ΠI in Figure 1, the larger sets (including the dark blue areas) correspond
to P̃I under Restriction 1. The identified set is highly informative: it is a two-dimensional set in a four-
dimensional space (recall from Proposition 3 that P̃I is at most at the same dimension as ΠI), excluding
most points in P̃ from being possible counterfactual CCPs. Yet, because the baseline CCP p is almost
at the boundary of P̃I , it is difficult to rule out in practice the possibility that the entry subsidy has no
impact on firm’s behavior. Adding Restriction 2 reduces the size of P̃I substantially (corresponding to the
light blue areas in the figure). This is a direct consequence of the smaller set ΠI obtained after imposing
Restriction 2 in addition to Restriction 1 (see Figure 1). The baseline CCP does not belong to P̃I once
we add Restriction 2; in fact, the location of p and P̃I allows us to conclude that the probability of entry
increases in the counterfactual and that the probability of staying decreases. In other words, the sign of
the treatment effect is identified. The exclusion restriction on scrap values (Restriction 3) has substantial
identification power, making P̃I one-dimensional (because ΠI becomes one-dimensional as well) – see the
blue lines in the figure. Note that all identified sets are connected, as expected (Proposition 3), but not
necessarily convex.
We now turn to some low-dimensional outcomes θ, in particular, the long-run average impact of the
entry subsidy on (i) the probability of staying in the market (labelled θP ), (ii) consumer surplus (θCS),
and (iii) the value of the firm (θV ). Table 1 presents the identified sets for each of these outcomes under
Restrictions 1–3.21
Perhaps surprisingly, the entry subsidy decreases the long-run average probability of the firm staying
in the market, by approximately 6.4 percentage points. That is because, while the subsidy induces more
entry, it also induces more exit. In the current case, increasing both firm’s entry and exit rates results
in less time spent in the market in the long run. This in turn reduces the long-run average consumer
surplus, and raises the average long-run value of the firm.
As expected, the identified sets are all compact intervals (see Proposition 4), and they all contain the
true θ. Under Restriction 1, the upper bound of the identified set for θP is a negative number that is
very close to zero, leading to the conclusion that the long-run average probability of being active does
not increase in the counterfactual. The lower bound implies that the probability of staying active can
be reduced by at most 12 percentage points. Similarly, the researcher can conclude that the long-run
average consumer surplus does not go up (and decreases by at most $0.17), while the long-run average
21Assuming a (residual) linear inverse demand Pit = wit− ηQit, where Pit is the price and Qit is the quantity demanded,
and assuming a constant marginal cost mc, the variable profit is given by vp = (wit −mc)2/4η. The consumer surplus is
CS = 0 when the firm is inactive (a = 0), and CS = (wit −mc)2/8η when it is active (a = 1). Note that consumer surplus
is the same in the baseline and counterfactual scenarios; the average CS changes in the counterfactual because the firm
changes its entry behavior when it receives an entry subsidy. The value of the firm in the baseline is given by the vector




, where we take J = 0 (see footnote 10), and a similar expression holds for the counterfactual
value: Ṽ = (I − β̃F̃J)−1(π̃J + ψ̃J(p̃)). The average firm value (across states) changes in the counterfactual both because
the steady state distribution changes, and because the value of the firm is affected by the subsidy in all states. See the
Supplemental Material, Section B, for explicit formulas for θ = (θP , θCS , θV ).
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Table 1: Sharp Identified Sets for the Long-run Impact of the Entry Subsidy on Outcomes of Interest, ΘI
Outcome of Interest Target parameter Sharp Identified Sets
True Restriction 1 Restrictions 1–2 Restrictions 1–3
Change in Prob. of Being Active -0.0638 [-0.1235, -0.0001] [-0.1235, -0.0419] [-0.1235, -0.0421]
True Restriction 1 Restrictions 1–2 Restrictions 1–3
Change in Consumer Surplus -0.0875 [-0.1735, -0.0002] [-0.1735, -0.0571] [-0.1735, -0.0573]
True Restriction 1 Restrictions 1–2 Restrictions 1–3
Change in the Value of the Firm 0.9513 [0.0014, 1.8229] [0.6375, 1.8229] [0.6388, 1.8229]
Notes: This table shows the true and the sharp identified sets for the long-run average effect of the 20% entry subsidy on three
outcomes of interest in the firm entry/exit problem: the probability of staying active, the consumer surplus, and the value of the firm.
The averages are taken with respect to the state variables, using the steady-state distribution. The value of the model parameters and
Restrictions 1, 2, and 3 are all specified in Section 3. See the Supplemental Material, Section B, for details.
value of the firm does not go down (and increases at most by $1.8) in response to the subsidy. These are
informative identified sets despite the fact that Restriction 1 is mild.
Adding Restriction 2 makes all identified sets more informative. The upper bound on θP is now
lower, implying that the average probability of being active is now reduced by a number between 4 and
12 percentage points, which clearly identifies the sign of the impact. The endpoints of the intervals for
θP and θV change similarly. Adding Restriction 3 does not narrow the intervals much further, despite
the fact that this restriction has substantial identifying power related to the model parameters π and
counterfactual behavior p̃. That is because, while Restriction 3 reduces the dimension of ΠI and P̃I , it
does not eliminate the extreme points of these sets that, in turn, generate the endpoints of ΘI . In the
Supplemental Material (Section B) we present the three-dimensional identified set ΘI .
5 Estimation and Inference
We now present a uniformly valid inference procedure for the main outcomes of interest θ ∈ Θ ⊂ Rn.
More precisely, we are interested in constructing confidence sets (CS’s) for the true value of θ (rather
than for the identified set ΘI). Our approach is similar in spirit to the Hotz and Miller (1993) two-step
estimator: we estimate choice probabilities p and transitions of state variables F in the first step, and
then we perform inference on θ in the second step.
We assume the econometrician has access to a panel data on agents’ actions and states: {ait, xit :
i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T}. We consider asymptotics for the large N and fixed T case, as is typical in
microeconometric applications of single-agent models, and assume i.i.d. sampling in the cross-section
dimension.22 Given that actions and states are finite, we consider frequency estimators for both p and F .
22If the data is ergodic and an appropriate mixing condition is satisfied then our procedure remains valid when T → ∞
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(When states are continuous, one can use kernel estimators for p and F ; we leave extensions to continuous
states for future research.) Specifically, for all a ∈ A, and all x, x′ ∈ X ,
p̂aN (x) =
∑
it 1 {xit = x, ait = a}∑








′, xit = x, ait = a
}∑
it 1 {xit = x, ait = a}
, (23)
and the vectors of sample frequencies are denoted by p̂N and F̂N .
23 We collect the terms p̂N and F̂N into
the L–vector p̂N = [p̂1N , ..., p̂LN ]
′. Similarly, we collect p and F into p = [p1, ..., pL]
′ := E[e], where e is a
vector of observed indicators. Recall that each matrix Ma, a ∈ A, is a function of F , which is a subvector
of p, therefore we define Ma(p), a ∈ A, as the value of Ma evaluated at p and also define M(p) accordingly.
We use the same notation for b−J(p), as well as for M̃(p), b̃−J(p̃, p), and f(p̃, π; p) when appropriate.
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We construct a confidence set by inverting a test. The test is based on a test statistic ĴN (θ0) for
testing the null H0 : θ = θ0. The nominal level 1− α confidence set for θ is
CS = {θ ∈ Θ : NĴN (θ) ≤ ĉ1−α}, (24)
where ĉ1−α is a data-dependent critical value (discussed below).
To test the null H0 : θ = θ0, we reformulate the problem in the following way. For a fixed value θ = θ0,
we take the equality constraints on π:
Reqπ = req, (M̃(p)H)π = b̃−J (p̃, p)− M̃(p)g, and θ0 = f(p̃, π; p), for some p̃,
and collect them into
R(θ0, π, p̃; p) = 0.





where Ω is a (user-chosen) positive definite weighting matrix. If θ0 belongs to Θ
I then all restrictions are
and N is fixed.
23In certain cases some elements of the transition matrix F are degenerate when the corresponding states are known to
evolve deterministically; see equation (B1) in the Supplemental Material. We do not estimate these elements, and thus the
expressions in (23) are applied only to the rest of the elements of F that need to be estimated.
24Note that M̃ may also depend on baseline transitions F (and so may have to be estimated in the data). That is because
M̃ = [I,−M̃−J ], where M̃−J stacks M̃a for all a 6= J , with M̃a = (I − βF̃a)(I − βF̃J)−1, and F̃ = hs(F ). The same applies
to b̃−J , which also depends on F̃ .
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satisfied and J(θ0) = 0, otherwise J(θ0) > 0. The identified set Θ
I can therefore be represented as
ΘI = {θ ∈ Θ : J(θ) = 0}, (26)
which implies that the null H0 : θ = θ0 is equivalent to H
′
0 : J(θ0) = 0.
The empirical counterpart of J(θ0) is given by
ĴN (θ0) := min
(p̃,π)∈P̃×R(A+1)X :Riqπ≤riq ,
R(θ0,π,p̃; p̂N )=0
[b−J(p̂N )− M̂Nπ]′ Ω̂N [b−J(p̂N )− M̂Nπ], (27)
where M̂N = M(p̂N ) and Ω̂N is a consistent estimator for Ω. For the rest of this paper we consider a
general specification of Ω so that it can be a (known) continuous function of p. Denoting the function by
Ω(·), we let Ω̂N = Ω(p̂N ) in (27).
While a naive bootstrap for ĴN (θ0) fails to deliver critical values that are asymptotically uniformly
valid (see, e.g. Kitamura and Stoye, 2018), subsampling works under weak conditions, as we shall show
shortly. Let hN be the subsample size, with hN →∞ as N →∞. A subsample version of ĴN (θ0) is










−J − M̂∗hNπ], (28)
where p̂∗hN is a subsample estimator of p, M̂
∗
hN
= M(p̂∗hN ), Ω̂
∗
hN




)− b−J(p̂N ) + b̂−J(p̂N ),
with b̂−J(p̂N ) being the value of M̂Nπ solving the minimization problem (27). Note that with this
definition of b̂∗−J we implement subsampling with centering.
The testing procedure is simple: We use the empirical distribution of hN Ĵ
∗
hN
(θ0) to obtain the critical
value ĉ1−α. When the value of the test statistic is smaller than the critical value, NĴN (θ0) ≤ ĉ1−α, we do
not reject the null H ′0 : J(θ0) = 0, otherwise we reject it. The 1− α confidence set will be the collection
of θ0’s for which the tests do not reject the null.
Remark 4. A comment on some approaches that are alternative to ours as outlined above is in order.
First, if we treat (π, p̃) as a parameter (while θ0 is fixed), then our system becomes one of set identified
moment equalities (composed of equations (6), (12), and (15)), with (inequality) constraints on the
parameter space for (π, p̃) (i.e., restrictions (7) and (8)). It is then possible to test the validity of these
equalities at each value of (π, p̃). This controls size, but would be extremely conservative; obviously
the same can be done to standard moment inequality models but it is not implemented in practice for
this reason. Moreover, implementing such a procedure in our context is practically impossible, as the
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parameter space for (π, p̃) is too big. Second, we can fix p̃, but not π, and rewrite the system into a
moment inequality form by eliminating π (i.e. solving for other variables). As noted in Kitamura and
Stoye (2018), this amounts to transforming, in the language of discrete geometry, a V-representation of a
polytope to an H-representation, and it is generally known to be expensive to compute, and impractical
even for a moderately sized system. Third, one may try to eliminate both π and p̃ from the system to
get some form of moment inequalities; but this is even harder to implement, especially because of the
nonlinear constraints that involve p̃, and so it is not a practically feasible option either. For example, a
recent paper by Kaido, Molinari, and Stoye (2019) is, like ours, concerned with a low dimensional object,
though it is not directly applicable as their algorithm requires a moment inequality representation.
Before we state formal assumptions and the asymptotic validity result, it is useful to introduce some
notation. First, define the manifold
S(p, θ) := {M(p)π, π ∈ R(A+1)X : R(θ, π, p̃; p) = 0, and Riqπ ≤ riq hold for some p̃ ∈ P̃}.
Note that the minimization problem (25) projects b−J(p) on S(p, θ) under the weighted norm ‖x‖Ω = x′Ωx,
for x ∈ RAX . The corresponding value of the objective function J(θ) in (25) is the squared length of the
projection residual vector. Clearly, θ ∈ ΘI if and only if the residual vector is zero.
Next, for some positive constants c1 and c2, define the set
Pθ0 :=





< c2, 1 ≤ ` ≤ L,
∃(p̃, π) ∈ P̃× R(A+1)X such that M(p)π = b−J(p),
Riqπ ≤ riq, R(θ0, π, p̃; p) = 0,det(Ω(p)) ≥ c1

.
This represents the set of permissible data generating processes when the counterfactual value of interest
is fixed at θ0. Note that the first restriction in the definition Pθ0 is a standard condition imposed to
guarantee the Lindeberg condition. The second is the main model restriction. The third and the fourth
collect additional constraints on the payoff vector π; the equalities in the fourth restriction include the
constraints that arise as we fix the value of the counterfactual θ0. The final restriction guarantees that
the random manifold S(p̂N , θ0) is asymptotically well-behaved.
We impose a weak condition on f and hs:
Condition 1. f and hs are C1 functions.
It is useful to impose a mild requirement on S(p, θ) in terms of its local geometric property. To this
end, we introduce the notion of tangent cone:
Definition 1. For a (possibly non-convex) set A ⊂ Rd, the tangent cone of A at x ∈ A, henceforth
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denoted by TA(x), is given by
TA(x) := lim sup
τ↓0
τ−1(A	 x),
where 	 denotes the usual Minkowski difference.
See, e.g., Section 6A of Rockafellar and Wets (2009) for a discussion on the role of a tangent cone and
other related concepts.
Condition 2. For every (p, θ0) such that p ∈ Pθ0 and θ0 ∈ ΘI , the tangent cone TS(p,θ0)(x) of S(p, θ0) is
convex at each x ∈ RAX ∈ S(p, θ0).
Then the next theorem follows:






Pr{NĴN (θ0) ≤ ĉ1−α} = 1− α, for every θ0 ∈ ΘI ,
where ĉ1−α is the 1−α quantile of hN Ĵ∗hN (θ0), with 0 ≤ α ≤
1
2 . The asymptotically uniformly valid 1−α
confidence set for θ is the collection of θ0’s such that the test does not reject the null H
′
0 : J(θ0) = 0.
Our test statistic (27) is the squared minimum distance between the random vector b−J(p̂N ) and
the random manifold S(p̂N , θ0). It is therefore crucial to take sampling uncertainty in both objects into
account. Also, note that Condition 2 does not require that the set S(p̂N , θ0) is convex, even locally. That
is, the set does not have to be convex even in a small neighborhood of the true population value b−J ,
so that there may not exist any positive constant ε such that the intersection of the ε-neighborhood and
S(p̂N , θ0) (or S(pN , θ0)) is convex. We avoid such standard convexity conditions as they are typically
incompatible with our model restrictions, in particular the general equality restrictions R(θ0, π, p̃; p) = 0.
The above result establishes the asymptotic validity of our procedure, addressing these issues.
Next, we discuss briefly some practical issues when implementing the subsampling procedure. We
present further details in Online Appendix F.
Practical Implementation. To simplify, we focus the discussion on the scalar case, θ ∈ R. We suggest
implementing the subsampling procedure in the following way. First, calculate the lower and upper bounds
of the interval ΘI = [θL, θU ] by solving the maximization (and minimization) problem (20)–(21) in the








], so the null hypothesis
H ′0 : J(θ0) = 0 will not be rejected for any point in that interval. We therefore start the grid-search at
points slightly below θ̂
L
and slightly above θ̂
U
. Consider the points above θ̂
U
: we start with the point,
say, θ0 = θ̂
U
+ 0.01, and test the null H ′0 : J(θ0) = 0, as described above. If we fail to reject the null, we
then move to the next point, say, θ0 = θ̂
U
+ 0.02 and test the null for that new point. We keep doing so
until we reject the null for the first time; we stop the grid-search when we first reject the null because all
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points to the right will be rejected by the data as well; we adopt a similar procedure for the lower end θ̂
L
.
Changing θ0 sequentially and incrementally also has the advantage of providing good initial guesses in
a series of optimizations: because (27) is a smooth and well-behaved problem, the solution to the latest
minimization can be used as an initial value for the next minimization, reducing the total computational
costs; the same applies in the critical value calculations.25 If we reject the null for the first time at the
points θl and θu, then the asymptotically uniformly valid 1−α confidence set for the true θ is the interval
[θl, θu].
6 Empirical Application
In this section, we illustrate our approach in the context of a dynamic model of export behavior. To that
end, we consider the setup of Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007), henceforth ‘DRT’, who use plant-level
panel data from Colombian manufacturing industries to investigate the impact of export subsidies. As the
authors point out, industrial exporters are highly prized in developing countries for generating gains from
trade, sustaining production and employment during domestic recessions, and facilitating the absorption
of foreign technologies. As a consequence, exporters often receive governmental support. Yet, seemingly
similar subsidies may generate different export responses in different industries and time periods, making
it difficult for policy makers to know which type of support is optimal. To shed light on these issues,
DRT develop a structural dynamic model of firm export decisions and simulate the impact of various
subsidies on gains in export revenues per peso of subsidy. Here, we adopt their specification and explore
the identifying power of alternative model restrictions.
Data. We consider the knitting mills industry. The dataset is composed of 64 knit fabric producers
observed annually during the period 1981–1991; the sample has 704 plant-year observations. Like DRT,
we focus on firms that operated continuously in the domestic market, given that they were responsible
for most of the exports over this period. The share of exporting firms increased from 12 percent in 1981
to 18 percent by the end of the sample period, possibly a result of the 33% depreciation of Colombia’s
real exchange rate. This industry also depicts significant turnover: the average probability of re-entry
into export markets is 61%. On average, export revenues of exporting firms are approximately 1.4 times
the domestic revenues.
Model. DRT assume that export markets are monopolistically competitive; this leads to a specification
similar to the firm entry/exit model presented in Sections 3 and 4. In particular, every period t a firm
25In addition to the (limited) grid-search and the sequence of optimizations, we can exploit the relation between the
optimization problems (20)–(21) and (27) (as well as (28)) to improve the performance of the subsampling further: in our
experience it is easier to solve relaxed versions of (20)–(21) to obtain good approximations for ĴN (θ0) than solving (27)
directly. Furthermore, subsampling is amenable to parallelization, which speeds up the procedure. See Online Appendix F
for details.
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i chooses whether to export or not, ait ∈ A = {0, 1}. The state variables are (i) the lagged decisions
(kit = ait−1), (ii) exchange rates (et), and (iii) demand/supply shocks in export markets (νit). The
exogenous shocks wit = (et, νit) follow (discretized) independent normal-AR(1) processes. The payoff
function is given by equation (10) in Section 3. To point identify the model, DRT restrict to zero the
payoffs of not exporting (i.e., both the outside value and the scrap value are set to zero). They also impose
state-invariant entry and fixed costs, making their model overidentified. We relax these assumptions and
instead explore the identifying power of Restrictions 1, 2, and 3 presented in the entry/exit model. In
principle, scrap values may differ from zero because they may involve idleness costs (given that exiting is
often temporary) or depreciation costs. Similarly, fixed costs and entry costs may depend on the aggregate
states, as they involve finding trading partners, setting up distribution networks, maintaining labor and
capital abroad, etc. For ease of exposition, we leave the model details to the Supplemental Material.26
Counterfactuals and Outcomes of Interest. DRT focus on three counterfactual policies: (i) direct
subsidies linked to plants’ export revenues, such as a tax rebate that is proportional to foreign sales; (ii)
subsidies to the costs of entering into exporting, such as grants for information or technology acquisition
for export development; and (iii) payments designed to cover the annual fixed costs of operating in the
export market. We follow DRT and consider a 2% export revenue subsidy, a 25% entry cost subsidy, and
a 28% fixed cost subsidy.
The main outcome of interest is a benefit–cost ratio based on the average annual gain in total export
revenues divided by the average government subsidy expenditures (both averaged over states in the long-
run). We denote the ratios for the revenue, fixed costs, and entry costs subsidies by θR, θF , and θE ,
respectively, and take θ = (θR, θF , θE) – see the Supplemental Material (Section D) for explicit formulas
for θ.
Evaluating ex-ante the impact of different model restrictions on θ is not trivial. Note first that
while export revenues are observed in the data, the long-run average change in revenues depends on
firms’ decisions to export given the type of subsidy. This means that all numerators in θ depend on
the counterfactual CCPs. Next, note that all denominators in θ equal the long-run average government
expenditures, which depend on the fraction of firms exporting in the counterfactual steady-state; i.e.,
they all depend on p̃ as well. In addition, θF and θE depend on the unknown parameters, fc and ec,
respectively, since the government expenditures are direct functions of these costs. In the case of the
entry cost subsidy, a further complication is that the (subsidized) entry cost is paid only when firms
enter, implying that p̃ affects the direct payments in each state (in addition to affecting the steady-state
distribution). In short, θ depends on both p̃ and π highly nonlinearly.
In terms of identification, the benefit-cost ratio of the revenues subsidy θR is point-identified. That
26The payoff when not exporting (the outside option) may also be different from zero since it includes domestic profits.
However, following DRT, we do not explore this possibility given the limitations in the data.
29
is both because the averages in the numerator and denominator depend on observed revenues (i.e., the
integrands are observable), and because p̃ is identified (since it involves known changes to known quantities,
i.e., the identified variable profits; see KSS), implying that the counterfactual steady-state distribution is
also point-identified. The other two target objects, θF and θE , are partially identified both because (i) the
counterfactual behavior p̃ is not point-identified (as the entry subsidy in our toy example in Section 4),
and (ii) the denominators in the benefit–cost ratios depend directly on model parameters that are partially
identified (i.e., on fc and ec, respectively). In sum, both θF and θE involve ratios of set-identified objects.
Results. We implement our two-step procedure as explained in Sections 4 and 5, and in Online Appendix
F.27 Table 2 presents the benefit–cost ratios under Restrictions 1–3. The revenue subsidy generates
an estimated benefit–cost ratio θR of approximately 15 pesos of revenue per unit cost. Its impact is
statistically significant and economically large, and it is fairly consistent with the estimates in DRT.
Because θR is point identified, it does not depend on any additional model restriction (other than the
basic framework (6)).
We now discuss θF and θE , which are partially identified. Restriction 1 (i.e., fc ≥ 0 and ec ≥ 0) is
not sufficiently informative here: the fixed cost subsidies ratio θF is between 8 and 30, and the entry cost
subsidies ratio θE ranges from 4 to 24. These sets are wide because there are still many model parameter
values that can rationalize observed behavior. The identified sets overlap and we cannot conclude which
policy generates the greatest impact on exports.
Adding Restriction 2 increases the identification power substantially: the ratio for the fixed cost
subsidies is now between 11 and 13. This identified set is highly informative and its upper bound is
smaller than θR, suggesting that the revenue subsidy is more potent than the fixed cost subsidy. Still,
there is substantial uncertainty regarding the benefit–cost ratio for the entry cost subsidy: its identified
set is now between 7.8 and 17, containing both the estimated θR and the identified set of θF . Incorporating
exclusion restrictions on scrap values (Restriction 3) narrows the identified set for θE substantially: the
benefit-cost ratio now ranges from 8.9 to 9.4, which is highly informative.28
There is a clear ranking of the policies under Restrictions 1–3: revenue subsidies generate the highest
export revenues per unit cost, followed by fixed cost subsidies, and then by the entry cost subsidies. That
27The transition process for exchange rates is taken from a long-time series as in DRT. Given the small sample size, we
discretize the support of each exogenous state, et and νit, in three bins. We estimate CCPs using frequency estimators.
To compute confidence intervals, we implement 1000 replications of a standard i.i.d. subsampling, resampling 20 firms over
the sample time period, so that the size of each subsample is hN = 200 ≈ 8 ×
√
NT . To minimize the quadratic distances
in (27) and (28), we take a diagonal weighting matrix Ω with diagonal elements given by the square-root of the ergodic
distribution of the state variable – thus, deviations on more visited states are considered more relevant and receive greater
weights. Given that θR is known (ex ante) to be point identified, we use the plug-in estimator proposed by Kalouptsidi, Lima,
and Souza-Rodrigues (2019) to estimate it, and 1000 standard i.i.d. bootstrap replications at the firm level to construct the
confidence intervals for θR. To make our results comparable to DRT, we have also estimated the model parameters under
their restrictions and obtained very similar results as theirs. See details in Section D of the Supplemental Material.
28Of note, the reduction is driven mostly by assuming scrap values do not depend on demand/costs shocks νit. This
(limited) exclusion restriction may be reasonable when scrap values include idleness and depreciation costs incurred abroad,
which may depend on exchange rates, but not on, say, demand shocks.
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Table 2: Export Revenue/Cost Ratio for Different Subsidies under Alternative Model Restrictions
Restriction 1 Restrictions 1–2 Restrictions 1–3
Revenue Subsidies
Estimated Identified Set 15.13 15.13 15.13
90% Confidence Interval (11.15, 18.90) (11.15, 18.90) (11.15, 18.90)
Fixed Costs Subsidies
Estimated Identified Set [8.41, 30.82] [11.10, 13.34] [11.92, 12.60]
90% Confidence Interval (7.47, 34.98) (9.65, 14.46) (9.92, 13.87)
Entry Costs Subsidies
Estimated Identified Set [4.40, 24.04] [7.85, 17.28] [8.88, 9.36]
90% Confidence Interval (3.52, 34.36) (7.03, 23.49) (7.34, 14.33)
Notes: This table shows the sharp identified sets for the average gains in total export revenues divided by the
average government subsidy expenditures, both averaged over states in the long-run. The top panel shows the
gains of a 2% export revenue subsidy; the middle panel, the gains of a 28% fixed cost subsidy; and the bottom
panel, the gains of a 25% entry cost subsidy. The (nonsingleton) identified sets are in brackets. The data set is
composed of 704 plant-year observations in the Colombian knitting mills industry. The 90% confidence intervals
are in parenthesis and were calculated based on 1000 bootstrap replications for the revenue subsidies, and 1000
subsample replications for both fixed and entry costs subsidies (with subsample sizes of 200). Restrictions 1, 2,
and 3 are all specified in the main text (Section 3). See Online Appendix D for details.
is exactly the ranking obtained by DRT. The result is intuitive: revenue subsidies affect both volume and
entry margins, while fixed costs and entry costs influence only the entry and exit decisions. In addition,
fixed cost subsidies do not encourage exit behavior of forward-looking firms, while entry cost subsidies
do. Still, notwithstanding these intuitive effects, the ranking seems to hinge on the assumption that scrap
values do not depend on state variables.
Of note, the uniformly valid confidence intervals indicate substantial sampling uncertainty, which is
not surprising given the size of the data set.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study partial identification of model parameters and counterfactual objects in dynamic
discrete choice models. We derive analytical properties of the identified sets under alternative model re-
strictions. We propose computational procedures for estimation and develop an asymptotically uniformly
valid inference approach based on subsampling. A Monte Carlo study of firm entry/exit shows the good
finite-sample performance of our procedure. Finally, we demonstrate the empirical implications of our
results in the study of Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) on exporting decisions and subsidies. We leave
extensions to identification of optimal policy interventions and to dynamic games for future research.
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This supplemental material consists of the following sections: Section A presents all proofs of the propo-
sitions and theorems presented in the main paper. Section B provides detailed information about the
firm entry/exit problem – our running example. Section C shows our Monte Carlo study. And Section D
discusses our replication of Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007).
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The identified set (9) is sharp by construction because equations (6), (7), and (8) contain all model
restrictions. Further, ΠI is a convex polyhedron given that it is the intersection of finitely many closed
halfspaces. In the absence of inequalities (8), ΠI is a linear manifold with dimension that equals X − d.
This implies that the dimension of ΠI under all restrictions also is X − d.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The identified set P̃I defined in (16) is sharp by construction because equations (6), (7), and (8) contain
all model restrictions, and equation (15) fully characterizes p̃ as an (implicit) function of π (see the
arguments in footnotes 10 and 17 in the main text, and the proof of Proposition 3).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Clearly, P̃I is empty whenever ΠI is empty. Assume hereafter that ΠI is non-empty. Recall that the
identified set is characterized by the equations (6), (7), (8), and (15). By combining (6) and (7), we get
(Req−JM−J +R
eq
J )πJ = r
eq −Req−Jb−J (p) ,
∗Affiliations: Myrto Kalouptsidi, Harvard University, CEPR and NBER; Yuichi Kitamura, Yale University and Cowles
Foundation for Research in Economics; Lucas Lima, Harvard University; Eduardo Souza-Rodrigues, University of Toronto.
1
which is of the form:
QeqπJ = q
eq, (A1)
where Qeq = Req−JM−J +R
eq
J is a d×X matrix (defined in equation (18)), and qeq = req −R
eq
−Jb−J (p) ∈
Rd. Equation (A1) incorporates all equality restrictions on π, and expresses them in terms of the “free
parameter” πJ ∈ RX .
The set of solutions to the system (A1) can be represented by
πJ = Q
eq′ (QeqQeq′)−1 qeq + (I − PQ)z, (A2)
where PQ = Q
eq′ (QeqQeq′)−1Qeq, and the vector z ∈ RX parameterizes the set of solutions. Represent
the elements of this set by πJ(z). Note that in the absence of the equality restrictions (7), we can just
take πJ = z.
1
Similarly, combine (6) and (8), to get
(Riq−JM−J +R
iq
J )πJ ≤ r
iq −Riq−Jb−J (p) ,
which is of the form:
QiqπJ ≤ qiq,
where Qiq = Riq−JM−J + R
iq
J is an m×X matrix, and qiq = riq − R
iq
−Jb−J (p) ∈ Rm. Substituting πJ in
the inequality above by πJ(z) defined in (A2) and rearranging, we get the m inequalities defined in terms
of z ∈ RX :















Clearly, Z is a convex polyhedron. By construction, any vector π = [π′−J , π′J ]′ such that π−J =
M−JπJ(z) + b−J , with πJ(z) defined by (A2) for some z ∈ Z satisfies (6), (7), and (8). I.e., for any
given z ∈ Z, we can find one π satisfying all model restrictions.
Next, combine (6) and (15) to obtain












= b̃−J (p̃)− M̃g,
1If the restrictions (7) suffice to point-identify the model, then Qeq is invertible, πJ = (Q
eq)−1qeq, and the remaining πa,







b−J(p) = b̃−J (p̃)− g−J + M̃−JgJ , (A5)
where C is the ÃX̃ ×X matrix defined in equation (17).
Noting that p̃ has to satisfy X̃ restrictions as it is a collection of conditional probability vectors, let
p̃∗ denote a ÃX̃-vector of independent elements of p̃, and denote the set of independent elements by P̃∗.

































where int(P̃∗) is the interior of the conditional probability simplex P̃∗. Clearly, the model and counter-
factual restrictions impose F (z, p̃∗) = 0, for all z ∈ Z.



















∂p̃∗ is everywhere invertible (see KSS), the implicit function theorem applies. Specifically, for a




= 0, there exist open sets U ⊆ RX and W ⊆ int(P̃∗)
such that z0 ∈ U and p̃∗0 ∈ W , and there exists a continuously differentiable function ϕ : U → W





















The rank of the matrix ∂ϕ(z)∂z equals the rank of C(I − PQ) because
∂b̃−J
∂p̃∗ is invertible everywhere.
Let rank(C(I − PQ)) = k. By the Rank Theorem, the image set of ϕ is a differentiable k-dimensional
manifold in int(P̃∗) (see Theorem 3.5.1 in Krantz and Parks, 2003). Clearly, by restricting z to the convex
3
polyhedron Z, the image set of ϕ becomes a k-dimensional manifold with boundary. In the absence of
the model restrictions (7), we have πJ = z and so the image set of ϕ becomes a manifold with dimension
that equals the rank of C.
We can construct a global function ϕ̄ defined on the entire domain Z based on the local function ϕ
defined above. To do so, we need to show that the constructed ϕ̄ is not a set-function on Z. I.e., if for any
pair of points (z0, p̃∗0) and (z0, p̃∗1) with z0 ∈ Z and p̃∗0, p̃∗1 ∈ int(P̃∗), if ϕ̄(z0) = p̃∗0 and ϕ̄(z0) = p̃∗1,
then we must have p̃∗0 = p̃∗1. Suppose by contradiction that there there exist implicit functions ϕ0 and









, with p̃∗0 6= p̃∗1. Next, recall that for any point z0 ∈ Z, there exists only one vector of
payoffs π(z0) = [π′−J(z
0), π′J(z
0)]′ satisfying all model restrictions: This vector is given by the elements
π−J(z
0) = M−JπJ(z
0) + b−J , and πJ(z
0) defined by (A2). This leads to the counterfactual payoff π̃(z0),
which is given by the affine function π̃(z0) = Hπ(z0) + g. Finally, the counterfactual payoff π̃(z0) can
generate just one conditional choice probability function in the counterfactual scenario (by the uniqueness
of the solution of the Bellman equation). We therefore must have p̃∗0 = p̃∗1 (as well as ϕ0 = ϕ1 = ϕ).
The global function ϕ̄ equals the local implicit functions everywhere.2
We conclude that the identified set P̃I is the image set of the global function ϕ̄, defined on the domain
Z. Consequently, P̃I is a manifold with boundary and with dimension in the interior given by the rank
of C(I −PQ). Further, P̃I is connected because ϕ̄ is a continuous function defined on the convex domain
Z. In addition, when ΠI is bounded, so is the closed set Z, which implies that ϕ̄(Z) is compact. Finally,
we have rank(C(I − PQ)) ≤ X − d because rank(C) ≤ min{ÃX̃,X} and rank(I − PQ) = X − d (given
that PQ is symmetric and idempotent).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The identified set ΘI defined in (19) is sharp by construction. We can construct payoff vectors satisfying
all model restrictions, denoted by π(z), and obtain the counterfactual CCP from the function p̃∗ = ϕ̄(z),
where ϕ̄ is continuously differentiable, z ∈ Z, and Z is defined in (A4), as explained in the proof of
Proposition 3. We have therefore
θ = f(p̃, π) = f(ϕ̄(z), π(z)) = f̄(z),
where we omit (p, F ) from the notation for simplicity. When the function f is continuous, so is the
function f̄ because ϕ̄(z) and π(z) are both continuous. Clearly, ΘI equals the image set of the function
f̄ defined on the domain Z. The image set is connected because Z is convex, and it becomes compact
when Z is compact (which happens when ΠI is bounded, see the proof of Proposition 3). Furthermore,
2While different z′s can generate the same p̃∗ (because the function ϕ is not one-to-one, which is at the heart of the
identification problem of dynamic discrete choice models), a single z cannot generate more than one p̃∗.
4
when θ is a scalar, the connected set ΘI becomes an interval.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 1
Consider a sequence {pN ∈ Pθ0 , N ∈ N}. Recall that p and F are determined by p. Let (pN , FN ) :=
(p(pN ), F (pN )). In what follows we prove the claim of the theorem for a fixed value θ0 ∈ ΘI , and in






their appropriate subsample counterparts with an asterisk symbol * in superscript) while omitting their
dependence on θ0 to ease the notational burden in the proof.
Let SN := S(pN , θ0) and ŜN := S(p̂N , θ0). Then writing ‖x‖2Ω := x′Ωx for x ∈ RAX ,







N [b−J(p̂N )− b−J(pN )]−
√







N [b−J(p̂N )− b−J(pN )]− ξ ‖2Ω̂N ,
where 	 denotes the usual Minkowski difference, and for c ∈ R++ and a set A ∈ Rd, we let cA denote the
set A dilated by the factor c, that is, {cx : x ∈ A}.
To show the theorem it suffices to consider sequences pN , N ∈ N such that
(i) infx∈bdy(SN ) ‖b−J(pN )− x‖Ω = O(1/
√
N), where bdy(SN ) is the boundary of SN , and
(ii) Each sequence {pN , N = 1, 2, ...} converges.
Suppose pN , N ∈ N satisfies (i) and (ii). The restrictions imposed on Pθ0 guarantee that along the
sequence pN it holds that
√
N [b−J(p̂N )− b−J(pN )]
d→ φ,
where φ is a zero mean Gaussian vector. In what follows we also use the following notation: for finite
sets V,W ⊆ Rd we let conv(V ) and cone(W ) denote the convex hull of V and the cone spanned by W ,
respectively; then the Minkowski sum conv(V ) ⊕ cone(W ) is a polyhedron. We approximate the last





‖φ− ξ‖2Ω + op(1), (A7)
where Π̄N = conv(V̄N ) ⊕ cone(W̄N ) is a random polyhedron, with V̄N = VN + v, VN ∈ RAX×m,
W̄N = WN + w, WN ∈ RAX×n, and v and w are RAX×m-valued and RAX×n-valued zero-mean Gaussian
random matrices, respectively, for some m,n ∈ N. Note that the estimation uncertainty in ŜN makes the
polyhedron Π̄N that appears in the asymptotic approximation (A7) random. Also define a (deterministic)
sequence of polyhedra ΠN = conv(VN ) ⊕ cone(WN ). By the representation theorem for polyhedra (see,
5
for example, Theorem 1.2 in Ziegler (2012)) we can write
ΠN = {ξ : Bξ ≤ µN} for some B ∈ R`×AX ,
where µN ≥ 0 for all N and µN = O(1).
Recalling that each transition matrix Fa, a ∈ A depends on pN (as so does F ), write
det(Ma(pN )) = det
(
(1− βFa(pN ))(1− βFJ(pN ))−1
)
=
det(I − βFa(pN ))
det(I − βFJ(pN ))
.
Let {λia(pN )} and {λiJ(pN )} be the eigenvalues of Fa(pN ) and FJ(pN ), then
det(Ma(pN )) =
det(β−1I − Fa(pN ))




−1 − λia(pN ))∏X
i=1(β
−1 − λiJ(pN ))
> c for every a ∈ A and every N ∈ N (A8)
holds for some c > 0 that does not depend on N as β is fixed in the unit interval (0, 1) and {λia(pN )} and
{λiJ(pN )} are inside the unit circle for every N .
Note that the approximation (A7) holds for any sequence {V ′N ,W ′N}N∈N such that V ′N = VN + o(1)
and W ′N = WN + o(1), and with Condition 1 and (A8) we can choose {VN ,WN}N∈N such that the matrix
B above does not depend on N . Then we have an alternative representation for the random polyhedron
Π̄N as well: for some positive definite matrix Σ it holds that











‖φ− ξ‖2Ω + op(1). (A9)
Next we turn to the subsample statistic Ĵ∗hN (θ0). To show the uniform validity of subsampling we can
instead analyze the asymptotic behavior of the statistic ĴhN , the Ĵ-statistic calculated from a random
sample of size hN , drawn according to pN (Romano and Shaikh, 2012). That is, we now study the
limiting behavior of the CDF GhN (x, pN ), N = 1, 2, ..., where G`(x, p) := Prp{`Ĵ`(θ0) ≤ x} for ` ∈ N.





‖φ∗ − ξ‖2Ω + op(1) (A10)
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where Π̄∗hN ,N = conv(V̄
∗
hN ,N
) ⊕ cone(W̄ ∗hN ,N ), with V̄
∗
hN ,N
= V ∗hN ,N + v
∗, V ∗hN ,N ∈ R
AX×m, W̄ ∗hN ,N =
W ∗hN ,N +w
∗, W ∗hN ,N ∈ R
AX×m, and φ∗, v∗ and w∗ are zero-mean Gaussian random elements taking values
in RAX , RAX×m and RAX×n with (φ∗, v∗, w∗) d= (φ, v, w). Define Π∗hN ,N = conv(V
∗
hN ,N
) ⊕ cone(W ∗hN ,N )
and observe that it has a half-space based representation Π∗hN ,N = {ξ : Bξ ≤
√
hN
N µN}. We now have
Π̄∗N =
{


















In sum, for every sequence pN , N ∈ N satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) above, by (A9) and (A11) and





(GhN (x, pN )−GN (x, pN )) ≤ 0.
We can now invoke Theorem 2.1 in Romano and Shaikh (2012) to conclude.
B Firm Dynamic Entry/Exit Model
We now provide explicit formulas for the main equations and outcomes of interest presented in the paper
in the context of the firm entry/exit model. By revisiting the numerical example shown in the main text
we focus on the role that each individual model restriction plays in shaping the payoff identified set ΠI .
In the example, the transition matrix of the state variables x = (k,w) becomes Fa = F
k
a ⊗ Fw, where
F ka is the 2× 2 transition matrix for k, with (l, j) elements Pr[kit+1 = j|ait = l, kit] that equal one when


















 , π1 =
 vp− fc− ec
vp− fc
 .
The vector of CCPs is composed of pa (k,w). To simplify notation, we let pa (k) be a vector of
dimension W (i.e., we fix k and run over w) so that p =
(
p′0 (0) , p
′
1 (0) , p
′





Consider the main equality constraint resulting from the DDC framework and take J = 0 (i.e., equation
7
(2) presented in the main text)
π1 = M1π0 + b1(p). (B2)
This equation indicates that X = KW = 2W parameters need to be specified for point-identification.
Thus, if π0 is known, then π1 is recovered. Indeed, let us first compute M1, defined in (3). Here, we have
M1 =
I −βFw
0 I − βFw
I − βFw 0
−βFw I
−1 ,
where the inverse in the above expression is easily verified to be (I − βFw)−1 0




I + βFw −βFw
βFw I − βFw
 .





I + βFw −βFw




given that ψa(p(x)) = κ− ln pa(x), where κ is the Euler constant. Thus equation (B2) becomes vp− fc− ec
vp− fc
 =
I + βFw −βFw
βFw I − βFw
 π̄0
s
+ b1 (p) . (B3)
Note now that if π0 is known, namely both the scrap vector s and π̄0 are given, they suffice to identify
π1, but they do not suffice to separate the 3W parameters, vp, fc, and ec. Suppose in addition that vp is










where I2 is the 2× 2 identity matrix.
We want to find an explicit relation between ec, fc, and s. First, we invert the equation above to


























I + βFw −βFw












−βFwπ̄0 − (I − βFw)s
+
 bl (p)− bu (p)
−bl (p) + vp
 , (B5)
where the vectors bu (p) and bl (p) constitute the upper and lower parts of b1 (p), that is b1 (p) =




In particular, if π̄0 = 0 the above becomes,
ec = s+ bl(p)− bu(p),
fc =− (I − βFw) s− bl(p) + vp.
Clearly, given any one of the three parameters ec, fc, s, the remaining two are uniquely determined.
These equations have an interesting interpretation. In the case of logit shocks, and assuming that
π̄0 = 0, the first equation above becomes:
s− ec = ln p1 (0)
p0 (0)
− ln p1 (1)
p0 (1)
.
The difference between the scrap values and the entry cost is identified; the difference is given by the
contrast between the odds of the probability of entry (p1 (0) /p0 (0)) and the odds of the probability of
staying in the market (p1 (1) /p0 (1)). Intuitively, in the data, the larger the probability of entry relative to
the probability of staying, the smaller the entry cost relative to the scrap value. (A similar interpretation
relating scrap values and fixed costs holds for the second equation above.)
Model Restrictions. We now turn to the model restrictions. For ease of exposition, we focus on the
restrictions presented in the main paper:
1. π0 = 0, fc ≥ 0, ec ≥ 0, and vp is known.
2. vp− fc ≤ ec ≤ E[vp−fc]1−β , and π1(1, w
h) ≥ π1(1, wl).
3. s does not depend on w.
Restriction 1. Under equation (B5), ec ≥ 0 and fc ≥ 0 translate respectively to:
s ≥ bu (p)− bl (p) , (B6)
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(I − βFw) s ≤ vp− bl (p) . (B7)
Visualizing the set of inequalities (B6) is clear: the positive orthant is shifted to the point bu (p)− bl (p).
The hyperplanes under (B7) intersect at a unique point because (I − βFw) is invertible. Suppose
W = 2, then equation (B7) is written as the following two equations:
(1− βf1) s1 − β (1− f1) s2 ≤ vp1 − bl1 (p)
−β (1− f2) s1 + (1− βf2) s2 ≤ vp2 − bl2 (p)
where
Fw =
 f1 1− f1
1− f2 f2
 ,
s = [s1, s2]
′, and similarly for the vectors vp and bl(p). Both lines in the inequalities above have positive
slope and are thus increasing.
Figure B1 presents the set of values that s can take for the parameter configuration used in the
numerical example presented in Section 3 of the main paper. In the left panel, we present the set implied
by ec ≥ 0; on the right panel, the set implied by fc ≥ 0. In both panels, the horizontal axis represents
scrap values when the shock is low, wl, and the vertical axis, scrap values when the shock is high, wh.
(For ease of exposition, we limit the values in the figures to be between -100 and 100.) The true s is
represented by the black dots. Clearly, the larger polygon presented in panel (b) of Figure 1 in the main
text combines all restrictions presented separately in Figure B1.
(a) Restriction: ec ≥ 0 (b) Restriction: fc ≥ 0
Figure B1: Payoff Identified Set ΠI : Scrap Values under Alternative Restrictions
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Remark B1. In summary, given the reference action J = 0, the polytope
ΠIJ =
{
πJ ∈ RX : (Req−JM−J +R
eq
J )πJ = r




J )πJ ≤ r
iq −Riq−Jb−J
}
is given by the W−dimensional polyhedral set
{
(0, s) ∈ R2W : such that s satisfies equations (B6) and (B7)
}
.
Restriction 2. We first express the three sets of inequalities of Restriction 2 in terms of the payoffs π0
and π1. Condition vp− fc ≤ ec becomes
π1(0) ≤ 0. (B8)
Next, we focus on ec ≤ E [vp− fc] / (1− β). Let q denote the stationary distribution of Fw, i.e. q′Fw = q′.
Then, the inequality becomes
ec ≤ 1
1− β
1q′ (vp− fc) ,
where 1 is a W × 1 vector of ones. From the definition of π1 we have that ec = π1(1) − π1(0) and











π1 ≤ 0. (B9)
Finally, monotonicity in π1(1) means
[0 0 1 -1]π1 ≤ 0. (B10)
Now we stack (B8), (B9) and (B10), so that:





−I2 I2 − 11−β1q
′
0 [1 -1]
π1 ≤ 0, (B11)
and RiqJ = R
iq
0 = 0 and r
iq = 0. Moreover, multiplying Riq1 , from (B11), with M1 gives,
Riq1 M1 =










β [1 -1]Fw [1 -1] (I − βFw)
 .
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The scrap values are confined by the inequalities (Riq1 M1 +R
iq
0 )π0 ≤ riq −R
iq









[1 -1] (I − βFw) s ≤ bl2(p)− bl1(p),
or in more detail,
−βf1s1 − β (1− f1) s2 ≤ bu1(p)
−β (1− f2) s1 − βf2s2 ≤ bu2(p)




q1bl1(p) + (1− q1) bl2(p)
)




q1bl1(p) + (1− q1) bl2(p)
)
(
1− β (f1 + f2 − 1)
)
(s1 − s2) ≤ bl1(p) + bl2(p),
where q = [q1, 1− q1]′.
The first two inequalities correspond to the restriction vp − fc ≤ ec. They imply lower bounds on
scrap values. Note that these first two lines have negative slope and hence are decreasing. They have
a unique intersection if detFw 6= 0 or f2 6= 1 − f1.3 The next two inequalities correspond to condition
ec ≤ E [vp− fc] / (1− β). They define a box constraining the difference s1− s2. And the monotonicity in
π1(1) assumption implies the fifth inequality above. That line has positive slope and so any point above
that line satisfies the restriction.
Like Figure B1 above, Figure B2 shows the values of s for the parameter configuration presented in
Section 3 of the main paper but under Restriction 2. Panel (a) shows the set under condition vp−fc ≤ ec
(with the two downward slope lines); panel (b) presents the set under ec ≤ E [vp− fc] / (1− β) (with
s1 − s2 constrained in a box); and panel (c) shows the set under the monotonicity condition. Their
intersection result in the light blue polygon presented in panel (b) of Figure 1 in the main text.
Restriction 3. If s1 = s2 = s, there is a single free parameter. This clearly results in a single line,
presented in panel (d) of Figure B2. Combining Restrictions 1–3 result in the blue line inside the light
blue polyhedron in panel (b) of Figure 1.
3If detFw = 0 then the two constraints collapse to the single constraint:






(a) Restriction: vp− fc ≤ ec (b) Restriction: ec ≤ E[vp−fc]1−β
(c) Restriction: π1(1, w
h) ≥ π1(1, wl) (d) Restriction: s does not depend on w
Figure B2: Payoff Identified Set ΠI : Scrap Values under Alternative Model Restrictions
Counterfactuals. In the firm example, we consider a counterfactual experiment that decreases entry
cost by 20%, and holds everything else the same as in the baseline. This means we take g = 0 and H
block-diagonal with diagonal blocks given by H00 = I and
H11 =
τI2 (1− τ) I2
0 I2
 .
Combining equations (5) and (15), we obtain
b̃1 (p̃) = CπJ + (H11 −M1H21) b1 (p)− g1 + M̃1g0,
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where C is defined in equation (17), and g = [g′0, g
′
1]
′. Since g = 0 and H21 = 0, the above becomes:
b̃1 (p̃) = CπJ +H11b1 (p) . (B12)
We next calculate C:
C = H11M1 −M1H00 =
τI2 (1− τ) I2
0 I2
I2 + βFw −βFw
βFw I2 − βFw
−
I2 + βFw −βFw
βFw I2 − βFw

=
(τ − 1) I2 (1− τ) I2
0 0
 .
Clearly, rank(C) = 2. We thus conclude that even in the absence of any restrictions (e.g. π0 (0) = π0 = 0),
the counterfactual CCPs live in a 2-dimensional manifold. (See Proposition 3.)
To see whether the restriction π0(0) = 0 reduces the dimension of the identified set for the counter-











 = I2. Thus PQ =
 I2
0
 [I2 0] =
I2 0
0 0










0 (1− τ) I2
0 0
 ,
and rank(C(I−PQ)) = 2. The added restriction does not alter the dimension of the counterfactual CCP,
although it makes equation (2) (or (B5)) simpler.
Counterfactual Outcomes of Interest. In our example, we consider the long-run average impact of
the entry subsidy τ on (i) the probability of staying in the market (labelled θP ), (ii) the consumer surplus
(θCS), and (iii) the value of the firm (θV ).
Probability of Being Active. The long-run average effect on the probability of being active is given by
θP = E[p̃1 (x)]− E[p1 (x)],
where the expectations are taken with respect to the ergodic distributions of the state variables x in the















F̃ (x′|x, a) p̃a (x) ,
and a similar expression holds for the baseline ergodic distribution f∗(x).
When x = (k,w) ∈ K ×W, and k is the lagged action, the expression for θP simplifies. First, note
that the probability of choosing action a at time period t conditioned on the exogenous states w is given
by
Pr(ait = a|wit) =
∑
k∈K
Pr(ait = a|kit = k,wit) Pr(kit = k|wit),
which implies
Pr(ait = a|wit) =
∑
k∈K
pa(k,wit) Pr(ait−1 = k|wit).


















Let f̃∗W and f
∗
W be the steady-state distributions of the exogenous variables in the counterfactual and
baseline scenarios, respectively. Then









The inner sum in the first term equals p̃1 (w) due to (B13). A similar remark holds for the inner sum




















CS (a, x) pa(x)f
∗ (x) .
In the special case in which x = (k,w), and k is the lagged action and w are exogenous shocks, we
4For instance, in the binary choice model, we have Pr(a = 1|w) = p1(0, w)(1 − Pr(a = 1|w)) + p1(1, w) Pr(a = 1|w),
which implies Pr(a = 1|w) = p1(0, w)/[1− p1(1, w) + p1(0, w)].
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compute the consumer surplus for each action and state, CS(a, k, w), by assuming a (residual) linear
inverse demand P = w − ηQ, where P is the price and Q is the quantity demanded, and assuming a
constant marginal cost mc. These imply that CS(a, k, w) = 0 when the firm is inactive (a = 0), and
CS(a, k, w) = (w −mc)2/8η when it is active (a = 1). So,












Note that the consumer surplus function is the same in the baseline and counterfactual scenarios (and
so is the distribution of the exogenous states, f̃∗W = f
∗
W ). The average CS changes in the counterfactual
because the firm changes its entry behavior when it receives an entry subsidy.
Value of the Firm. The value of the firm in the baseline is given by the X × 1 vector





where we take J = 0 (see footnote 10 in the main text). A similar expression holds for the counterfactual




Ṽ (x) f̃∗ (x)−
∑
x∈X
V (x) f∗ (x) .
As before, let f̃∗ and f∗ denote the vector of steady-state distributions, then
θV = f̃
∗′ × (I − β̃F̃J)−1(π̃J + ψ̃J(p̃))





The average firm value (across states) changes in the counterfactual both because the steady state distri-
bution changes, and because the value of the firm is affected by the subsidy in all states.
Figure B3 presents the identified set for θ based on the parameter configuration of the firm entry/exit
model in Section 3. As before, the larger set (including the dark blue area) depicts ΘI under Restriction
1, while the smaller set (in light blue) shows the identified set under Restrictions 1–2, and the blue line
shows ΘI under Restrictions 1–3. The true θ is represented by the black dot.
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Figure B3: Identified Set ΘI under Restrictions 1–3
C A Monte Carlo Study
In this section, we present a Monte Carlo study to illustrate the finite-sample performance of our inference
procedure. We start with the setup, and then we show the results.
C.1 Setup
We extend the firm entry/exit problem presented in Sections 3 and 4 of the main text, allowing now for a
larger state space. Specifically, we assume the presence of three exogenous states, wt = (w1t, w2t, w3t), re-
flecting demand and supply shocks. The exogenous states are independent to each other, and each follows
a discrete-AR(1) process with W support points (obtained by discretizing latent normally-distributed
AR(1) processes). The (residual) inverse demand function is linear, Pt = w̄ + w1t + w2t − ηQt, where
Pt is the price of the product, Qt is the quantity demanded, w̄ is the intercept, w1t and w2t are demand
shocks, and η is the slope. We assume constant marginal costs mct (i.e., mct does not depend on Qt),
and let the supply shocks w3t affect marginal costs. To simplify, we just take mct = w3t. Variable profits
are then vpt = (w̄ + w1t + w2t −mct)2/4η. The idiosyncratic shocks ε follow the type 1 extreme value
distribution. The model parameters are presented in Table C1.
The counterfactual we consider is the same as in the example in Section 4: a subsidy that reduces
entry costs by 20%. The target parameter θ is the long-run average probability of staying in the market
given the subsidy, where the long-run average is based on the ergodic distribution of the state variables;
the specific formula for θ is provided in Section B (but note that here we do not take the difference
between the counterfactual and the baseline average probabilities).
In order to analyze the sensitivity of the target parameter θ to alternative model restrictions, we follow
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Table C1: Parameters of the Monte Carlo Data Generating Process
Demand Function: w̄ 6.8 w1t ∼ Normal AR(1): ρ01 0
η 4 ρ11 0.75
σ21 0.02
Payoff Parameters: s 4.5 w2t ∼ Normal AR(1): ρ02 0
ec 5 ρ12 0.75
fc 0.5 σ22 0.025
Scale parameter: σ 1 w3t ∼ Normal AR(1): ρ03 0
ρ13 0.75
Discount Factor: β 0.9 σ23 0.03
the example again and impose the three sets of restrictions:
1. π0 = 0, fc ≥ 0, ec ≥ 0, and vp is known.
2. π1(1, w
h) ≥ π1(1, wl), and vp− fc ≤ ec ≤ E[vp−fc]1−β , where the expectation is taken over the ergodic
distribution of the state variables.
3. s does not depend on w.5
We generate 1000 Monte Carlo replications for each of the following sample sizes: the small sample,
with N = 100 firms on separated (independent) markets and T = 5 time periods, and the large sample,
with N = 1000 firms and T = 15 time periods. For the first sample period, the value of the state variables
are drawn from their steady-state distributions. Given that each exogenous state variable wjt can take
W values, the dimension of the state space is X = 2 ×W 3. We consider three sizes for the state space:
X = 16, 54 and 250, which correspond to W = 2, 3 and 5. The choices of the state space were dictated
by the sample size, not by computational constraints, given that the method makes use of a frequency,
or a nonparametric estimator for the CCP in the first stage. (As discussed in Online Appendix H, it is
feasible to solve the optimization problem (20)–(21) for state spaces that are larger in size.)
In each sample, we estimate the lower and upper bounds for the target parameter, θL and θU , by
solving the minimization and maximization problems (20)–(21). We estimate CCPs using frequency
estimators, and we use the true transition matrix F , both in calculating test statistics and critical values.
(The results do not change significantly when we estimate transition probabilities as well.) We solve the
problem (20)–(21) using the Knitro MATLAB function. We provide initial values for π by solving the
5When we impose Restriction 3, we replace the inequalities defined in Restriction 1 by their average versions. This does
not affect the identified set, but it improves the finite-sample behavior of the estimators when the sample size is small and
the state space is large.
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[b−J(p̂N )− M̂N π]′ Ω̂N [b−J(p̂N )− M̂N π].
We specify Ω̂N to be a diagonal matrix with diagonal terms given by the square-root of the ergodic
distribution of the exogenous state variables, implied by the transition process Fw. We opt for this
weighting matrix so that deviations on more visited states receive greater weights and are, therefore,
considered more relevant. This is the weighting matrix we use to compute ĴN (θ0).
We approximate the value of ĴN (θ0) for any fixed θ0 in practice by solving a relaxed version of the
optimization problem (20)–(21). We do so because when f is costly to evaluate (as it is in the present
case), it is difficult to solve directly the minimization problem (27) (and (28)), as it requires searching over
(p̃, π) to minimize JN (θ0) when the constraint θ0 = f(p̃, π; p, F ) must be satisfied exactly for a fixed θ0.
Putting differently, finding particular values for (p̃, π) that satisfy θ0 = f(p̃, π; p, F ) can be computationally
costly, while solving relaxed versions of the well-behaved problem (20)–(21) is substantially simpler. To
be specific, we solve the problem (F3)–(F4) for several values of ε, as explained in Online Appendix F.6
We calculate 90% confidence sets for θ using the procedure described in Section 5 of the main text
and in Online Appendix F. For each sample, we generate 1000 replicated samples with size that is
approximately hN ≈ 8 ×
√
NT . Specifically, we implement a standard i.i.d. subsampling, resampling
firms over the full time period: For the small sample we draw 36 firms randomly, and for the large
sample, we draw 65 firms. The computations were run on the FASRC Cannon cluster supported by the
FAS Division of Science Research Computing Group at Harvard University.
C.2 Monte Carlo Results
We now discuss the results of the Monte Carlo simulations. In the baseline scenario, the long-run average
probability that the firm stays in the market is 90.5%, while the long-run average probability of being
active reduces to 83.3% in the counterfactual scenario (so that θ = 0.833). The impact of the entry
subsidy is to reduce the long-run average by 7.2 percentage points. Similar to the example presented
in the main paper, the entry subsidy increases the exit rate of forward-looking firms, which translates
into firms staying less often in the market in the steady state. This result is invariant to the alternative
discretizations of the state space, since the discretizations are performed on the same underlying AR(1)
processes.
Table C2 presents the Monte Carlo results. The top, middle, and bottom panels show the results for
the alternative state spaces: small (X = 16), medium-sized (X = 54), and large (X = 250), respectively.
In each panel, the top subpanel presents the results for the small sample (N = 100, T = 5), and the bottom
6We let ε range from 0 to 1 in an equally spaced grid with 50 points.
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subpanel, for the large sample (N = 1000, T = 15). In each subpanel, we show for each alternative set
of Restrictions 1–3, (i) the populational (true) identified set, (ii) the average estimates of the lower and
upper bounds, θL and θU , (iii) the average bias of the estimated bounds, (iv) the average endpoints and
the average length of the 90% confidence sets, (v) the coverage probability of the confidence sets, and (vi)
the average time taken to estimate θL and θU (in seconds), and the average time taken to compute the
confidence intervals (in minutes).
The identified sets under the alternative Restrictions 1–3 are all compact intervals containing the
true θ (Proposition 4), and vary slightly with the size of the state space. Restriction 1 alone is highly
informative: the counterfactual long-run average probability of being active is between 75% and 90.5%.
It does however include the baseline probability (at the upper end of the interval). Adding Restriction 2
reduces the upper bound to 87.8%, which suffices to identify the sign of the impact of the subsidy. And
adding Restriction 3 pushes the upper bound further down to 86.8%.
In all cases, the estimated lower and upper bounds of the identified sets appear to be consistent,
with smaller biases in larger samples. The coverage probabilities of the confidence sets converge to the
nominal level 90%, as expected (Theorem 1). And the confidence sets’ average lengths are wider (though
not substantially) than the length of the true identified sets, for all sample sizes and state spaces. E.g.,
in the small state space case and large sample, the average length of the confidence set is 0.1782 under
Restriction 1, while the length of the (true) identified set is just 0.1536; and in the large state space and
small sample, the average length of the confidence set under the same restriction is 0.25.
Naturally, the finite sample performance of our inference procedure depends on both the state space
and the sample size. In the larger state space cases, we obtain slightly greater average biases for the
point estimates. These are expected: larger state spaces imply less (effective) degrees of freedom, as the
number of model parameters increases with the state space. (Recall that π is an (A+ 1)X vector.)
In terms of the computer time required to solve the minimization and maximization problems (20)–
(21), it takes approximately 0.03 seconds to solve both optimization problems under Restrictions 1 and
1–2, and that time is reduced to just 0.01 seconds under Restrictions 1–3, in the small state space case.
Subsampling is computationally intensive but feasible: for the same state space, the average time required
to run it varies from two minutes under Restriction 1 to one minute under Restrictions 1–3.
As expected, it takes longer to solve (20)–(21) when the state space is larger. E.g., under Restriction
1, it takes approximately 0.3 seconds on average in the medium-sized state space case (X = 54), and
approximately 6 seconds on average in the large state space case (X = 250). It also takes longer to run
the subsampling procedure: between 7 and 28 minutes on average in the medium-sized state space, and
between 150 and 580 minutes on average in the large state space, depending on the sample size and the
restrictions imposed. It is important to stress, however, that the average computer time here is based on
a sequential implementation of subsampling, which does not take advantage of parallelization.
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Table C2: Monte Carlo Results
Target Parameter: θ = Long-run Average Probability of Being Active
Small State Space: X = 16
T = 5, N = 100 Restrictions 1 Restrictions 1–2 Restrictions 1–3
True Identified Set [0.7500, 0.9036] [0.7500, 0.8763] [0.7500, 0.8662]
Average Estimated Bounds [0.7583, 0.9036] [0.7579, 0.8727] [0.7580, 0.8651]
Average Bias [0.0083, 0.0000] [0.0079, -0.0036] [0.0080, -0.0011]
Confidence Sets: Average Endpoints [0.6729, 0.9214] [0.6734, 0.8951] [0.6757, 0.8870]
Confidence Sets: Average Length 0.2485 0.2217 0.2113
Coverage Probability (90% nominal) 0.9060 0.9010 0.9050
Time Estimation (sec) 0.04 0.05 0.01
Time Inference (min) 2 2 1
T = 15, N = 1000 Restrictions 1 Restrictions 1–2 Restrictions 1–3
True Identified Set [0.7500, 0.9036] [0.7500, 0.8763] [0.7500, 0.8662]
Average Estimated Bounds [0.7507, 0.9036] [0.7507, 0.8761] [0.7507, 0.8661]
Average Bias [0.0007, -0.0000] [0.0007, -0.0002] [0.0007, -0.0001]
Confidence Sets: Average Endpoints [0.7296, 0.9079] [0.7296, 0.8806] [0.7297, 0.8713]
Confidence Sets: Average Length 0.1782 0.1510 0.1417
Coverage Probability (90% nominal) 0.9090 0.9010 0.9040
Time Estimation (sec) 0.04 0.04 0.01
Time Inference (min) 2 2 0.7
Medium-sized State Space: X = 54
T = 5, N = 100 Restriction 1 Restrictions 1–2 Restrictions 1–3
True Identified Set [0.7503, 0.9057] [0.7503, 0.8784] [0.7503, 0.8682]
Average Estimated Bounds [0.7591, 0.9036] [0.7581, 0.8710] [0.7586, 0.8641]
Average Bias [0.0089, -0.0021] [0.0078, -0.0074] [0.0083, -0.0041]
Confidence Sets: Average Endpoints [0.6656, 0.9235] [0.6589, 0.9042] [0.6628, 0.8932]
Confidence Sets: Average Length 0.2579 0.2453 0.2304
Coverage Probability (90% nominal) 0.8940 0.9050 0.8910
Time Estimation (sec) 0.34 0.41 0.03
Time Inference (min) 28 22 12
T = 15, N = 1000 Restriction 1 Restrictions 1–2 Restrictions 1–3
True Identified Set [0.7503, 0.9057] [0.7503, 0.8784] [0.7503, 0.8682]
Average Estimated Bounds [0.7509, 0.9056] [0.7509, 0.8782] [0.7509, 0.8680]
Average Bias [0.0006, -0.0001] [0.0006, -0.0002] [0.0006, -0.0002]
Confidence Sets: Average Endpoints [0.7292, 0.9101] [0.7290, 0.8831] [0.7290, 0.8748]
Confidence Sets: Average Length 0.1809 0.1541 0.1459
Coverage Probability (90% nominal) 0.9020 0.9070 0.8990
Time Estimation (sec) 0.30 0.27 0.03
Time Inference (min) 24 17 7
Large State Space: X = 250
T = 5, N = 100 Restriction 1 Restrictions 1–2 Restrictions 1–3
True Identified Set [0.7504, 0.9060] [0.7504, 0.8787] [0.7503, 0.8685]
Average Estimated Bounds [0.7612, 0.9027] [0.7605, 0.8701] [0.7593, 0.8638]
Average Bias [0.0108, -0.0033] [0.0102, -0.0086] [0.0090, -0.0047]
Confidence Sets: Average Endpoints [0.6678, 0.9253] [0.6602, 0.9096] [0.6621, 0.8979]
Confidence Sets: Average Length 0.2575 0.2494 0.2358
Coverage Probability (90% nominal) 0.8960 0.9090 0.9080
Time Estimation (sec) 7 8 0.7
Time Inference (min) 578 477 252
T = 15, N = 1000 Restrictions 1 Restrictions 1–2 Restrictions 1–3
True Identified Set [0.7504, 0.9060] [0.7504, 0.8787] [0.7503, 0.8685]
Average Estimated Bounds [0.7532, 0.9064] [0.7532, 0.8790] [0.7510, 0.8685]
Average Bias [0.0028, 0.0004] [0.0028, 0.0003] [0.0007, 0.0000]
onfidence Sets: Average Endpoints [0.7321, 0.9106] [0.7287, 0.8845] [0.7288, 0.8757]
Confidence Sets: Average Length 0.1786 0.1558 0.1469
Coverage Probability (90% nominal) 0.9070 0.9000 0.9020
Time Estimation (sec) 6 6 0.6
Time Inference (min) 505 457 150
Note: T = number of periods, N = number of markets, X = number of states.
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D Replication of Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007)
We now present briefly our replication of Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007), as well as the details of our
counterfactual exercise.
Parameter Estimates. As explained in the main text, every period t a firm i chooses whether to export or
not, ait ∈ A = {0, 1}, after observing the state variables kit (the lagged decision), et (the exchange rate),
νit (the demand/supply shocks in export markets), and the logit shocks εit. Both states kit and et are
observed by the econometrician, while νit can be recovered from data on export revenues, as explained
below.
The payoff function is given by equation (10) in Section 3. DRT specify the (log of) variable profits
as
ln vpit = ψ0 + ψ1 zi + ψ2 et + νit,
where zi is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is large or not (based on domestic sales in year
0). They also assume the profit shocks νit equal the sum of two independent AR(1) processes (so that
νit follows an ARMA(2,1) process). We instead assume νit is AR(1); the results are not sensitive to this
simplification.
We estimate the parameters of vp “offline.” Following DRT, we impose monopolistic competition in





ηi > 1 is a firm-specific foreign demand elasticity, and R
f
it are export revenues.
7 This relationship is useful
because Rfit is observed in the data while vpit is not. That implies the regression equation
lnRfit = ln ηi + ψ0 + ψ1 zi + ψ2 et + νit, (D1)
which can be used for estimation. Although ψ2 can be estimated directly by differencing the fixed-effects
out in (D1), we still need to estimate the demand elasticities ηi to recover the state variable νit. To deal
with the incidental parameters {ηi}Ni=1, DRT assume monopolistic competition in domestic markets and
impose that the ratio of foreign demand elasticities to domestic demand elasticities is constant for all











where Cit and Rit are total costs and total revenues (from both domestic and foreign markets), R
d
it are
domestic revenues, and ξit is an error term that accommodates noise in this relationship. Based on data on
costs and revenues, we estimate {ηi}Ni=1 and υ applying a Nonlinear Least Squares estimator to equation
7The standard markup equation implied by profit maximization under monopolistic competition is Rfit(1 − η
−1
i ) = C
f
it,
where Cfit is the variable cost of exporting.
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(D2). Then, given all estimated ηi’s, we regress lnR
f
it − ln ηi on zi and et to estimate ψ0, ψ1, and ψ2 in
equation (D1) using Ordinary Least Squares. The parameters of the νit process are estimated using the
Maximum Likelihood estimator applied to the residuals of that regression. Following DRT, we assume
the exchange rate et follows an AR(1) process and take the values estimated by Ocampo and Villar (1995)
based on a longer time-series, 1968–1992. After the parameters of the profit function, vp, and of the state
transitions, νit and et, are estimated we move to the estimation of the dynamic parameters (namely, s,
ec, and fc).
To estimate the dynamic parameters, we discretize the state space and estimate CCPs using frequency
estimators. Given the small sample size, we discretize the support of each exogenous state in three bins,
and ignore firms’ types (zi). Because νit is observed only when the firm is exporting, we assume that
every time a firm decides to start exporting, it draws a value from νit’s ergodic distribution. (This implies
that when the firm is not exporting, the only exogenous state is et.) Like DRT, we set the discount factor
to 0.9. Finally, we estimate the dynamic parameters, as well as the scale parameter σ, by searching the
values that best fit the dynamic equation (6), Mπ = σb−J (i.e, we use a Minimum Distance estimator).
Here, we impose DRT’s identification assumptions: scrap values are equal to zero, and fixed and entry
costs do not depend on states.
Table D1: Model Parameter Estimates
Profit Function Parameters (1) (2) Dynamic Parameters (1)
ψ0 (intercept) -10.89 -9.03 ec (entry cost) 127.45
(-20.46, -1.30) (-19.09, 1.03) (37.88, 239.34)
ψ1 (large domestic size) 1.45 -
(0.76, 2.15) -
ψ2 (exchange rate coefficient) 3.79 3.61 fc (fixed cost) 7.08
(1.76, 5.81) (1.48, 5.76) (2.03, 10.83)
λAR (AR root) 0.797 0.823
(0.785, 0.807) (0.818, 0.834)
σAR (AR unconditional std) 1.12 1.12 σ (scale parameter) 26.28
(1.10, 1.14) (1.10, 1.15) (7.94, 48.07)
Table D1 presents our results, with 90% confidence intervals in parentheses. Although our point
estimates are not identical to DRT’s estimates (as expected, given the small adjustments that we made),
they all lie in the range estimated by them (see column 4 of their Table 1, on page 851).8
Inference on Counterfactuals. We implement our inference procedure for θ = (θR, θF , θE) in the following
way: In the first step, we estimate (i) the state transitions, (ii) the variable profits as specified by DRT
8DRT do not implement a two-step approach as we do here. Instead, they estimate all model parameters simultaneously
by maximizing the likelihood function using a Bayesian MCMC estimator. Another difference is that they assume normally
distributed idiosyncratic shocks εit, while we assume a logit model. To make the scale parameters comparable, we need to
multiply our estimated σ by π√
6
. This is approximately 33.7, which is close to their estimates.
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(but omitting zi), and (iii) the conditional choice probabilities – all of them as explained above. In the
second step, we estimate the identified sets for each element of θ under alternative model restrictions
by solving the optimization problems (20)–(21). (To make our results comparable to DRT, we fix the
scale parameter σ at the estimated value presented in Table D1.) We then calculate the corresponding
confidence intervals as explained in Sections 4 and 5 of the main text and in Online Appendix F. We
implement 1000 replications of a standard i.i.d. subsampling, resampling 20 firms over the sample time
period, so that the size of each subsample is hN = 200 ≈ 8 ×
√
NT . To calculate the test statistic used
in the subsampling, ĴN (θ0), we minimize the quadratic distances in (27) and (28), as explained in Online
Appendix F, and we take a diagonal weighting matrix Ω with diagonal terms given by the square-root of
the ergodic distribution of the state variable – in this way, deviations on more visited states are considered
more relevant and receive greater weights. Given that the benefit-cost ratio of the revenues subsidy θR is
known (ex ante) to be point identified, we use the plug-in estimator proposed by Kalouptsidi, Lima, and
Souza-Rodrigues (2019) to estimate it, and 1000 standard i.i.d. bootstrap replications at the firm level
to construct the confidence intervals for θR.
The exact formula for each element of θ follows. Let f̃∗ and f∗ be vectors with the ergodic distributions
of the state variables in the counterfactual and in the baseline scenarios, respectively, arranged first by
kit and then by et and νit. (We abuse notation and use the same f̃
∗ for different counterfactuals.) The
first counterfactual is a 2% revenue subsidy; the benefit-cost ratio is given by
θR =
(f̃∗ − f∗)′ ×Rf
f̃∗′ × 0.02×Rf
,





where the zero vector at the top indicates that the firm is not exporting in the steady-state, k = 0, and
Rf are the export revenues ranging over et and νit when k = 1, according to equation (D1). (To simplify,
we set ηi at its estimated median.)
The second counterfactual is a fixed cost subsidy of 28% (which approximately matches the 2 million
pesos that DRT consider under their full set of restrictions). The benefit-cost ratio is now
θR =





where, as in the revenue subsidy, the vector in the denominator has a zero at the top indicating that firms
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are not exporting in the steady-state when k = 0.
Finally, the third counterfactual is an entry cost subsidy of 25%. The benefit-cost ratio here is
θR =





where ◦ is the Hadamard (i.e., element-wise) multiplication, and p̃1 is the counterfactual entry probability
vector. Note that the multiplication ec ◦ p̃1 in the denominator reflects the fact that subsidies are paid
only when the firm enters (which happens with probability p̃1).
When solving the optimization problems (20)–(21) for each element of θ = (θR, θF , θE), we provide
the numerical algorithm the gradients of θ based on the derivations presented in the Online Appendix G.
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